Hi,
Some secure protocols like SSH send encrypted keystrokes
as they're typed. By doing timing analysis you can figure
out which keys the user probably typed (keys that are
physically close together on a keyboard can be typed
faster). A careful analysis can reveal the length of
passwords and probably some of password itself.The paper:
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=1267612.1267637&coll=Portal&dl=GUIDE&CFID=1943417&C
FTOKEN=28290455I'm seriously considering implementing a fix for this
weakness. Is there any interest in incorporating this
sort of thing into openBSD?Cheers --Kevin
| debian developer | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Eric W. Biederman | Re: [net-2.6.24][patch 2/2] Dynamically allocate the loopback device |
| Sam Ravnborg | Re: [RFC/PATCH] Documentation of kernel messages |
| Andrew Morton | Re: -mm merge plans for 2.6.23 -- sys_fallocate |
git: | |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 15/37] dccp: Set per-connection CCIDs via socket options |
| David Miller | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| David Miller | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
