On 9/22/07, Douglas A. Tutty wrote:
A capsule summary of the situation is:
OpenBSD aims to improve security by taking advantage of easy-to-use,
hard-to-disable, low-overhead technologies.
yes, you can disable propolice if you need to, but you have to know how.
yes, you can disable random library mappings, but you have to know how.
yes, you can disable W^X, but you have to try.
you could turn off the security features, but why would you, since
they don't get in your way, and they don't slow you down all that
much. i've not seen SELinux installations (or similar technologies)
that are easy to use correctly...
--
GDB has a 'break' feature; why doesn't it have 'fix' too?
| david | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Bart Van Assche | Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
| Greg KH | [GIT PATCH] driver core patches against 2.6.24 |
| Heiko Carstens | Re: -mm merge plans for 2.6.23 -- sys_fallocate |
git: | |
| David Miller | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| Jarek Poplawski | [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 05/37] dccp: Cleanup routines for feature negotiation |
| Lennert Buytenhek | [PATCH 16/39] mv643xx_eth: get rid of ETH_/ethernet_/eth_ prefixes |
