On 9/22/07, Douglas A. Tutty wrote:
A capsule summary of the situation is:
OpenBSD aims to improve security by taking advantage of easy-to-use,
hard-to-disable, low-overhead technologies.
yes, you can disable propolice if you need to, but you have to know how.
yes, you can disable random library mappings, but you have to know how.
yes, you can disable W^X, but you have to try.
you could turn off the security features, but why would you, since
they don't get in your way, and they don't slow you down all that
much. i've not seen SELinux installations (or similar technologies)
that are easy to use correctly...
--
GDB has a 'break' feature; why doesn't it have 'fix' too?
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| Jan Engelhardt | intel iommu (Re: -mm merge plans for 2.6.23) |
| Greg Kroah-Hartman | [PATCH 005/196] Chinese: add translation of SubmittingDrivers |
git: | |
| David Fenyes | sigsetmask()? (LINUX) |
| Stephen Tweedie | Unmounting root (no kidding!) [was: Some Linux problems---solved] |
| Les Andrzejewski | X386/WD90C31/SUMSUNG SYNC MASTER 4 |
| Doug Evans | Re: Stabilizing Linux |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
| Linus Torvalds | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| Jarek Poplawski | [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Herbert Xu | Re: [PATCH] myr10ge: again fix lro_gen_skb() alignment |
