At this point, it's probably a good idea to point out there's a paper
called Trusting Trust about your everyday C compiler...


On 12/6/07, Lars Noodin <larsnooden@openoffice.org> wrote:
quoted text
> Hannah Schroeter wrote:
> > ...
> >> AFS is also encrypted, but unless its used to
> >> get all the tarballs and make them accessible locally (e.g. make a cd)
> >> it's not a help during the installation.
> >
> > I don't know enough about AFS to say anything about how to secure it
> > from the beginning on.
>
> I'm not very knowledgeable, but have been looking at the documenation
> lately:
> 	http://www.openafs.org/pages/doc/AdminGuide/auagd007.htm#HDRWQ75
>
> > ...
> >> Given the existence of Windows servers (aka compromised machines) on
> >> many networks, there are many chances for traffic to be intercepted,
> >> often even DNS.  So man-in-the-middle attacks appear to be theoretically
> >> easy during the first part of an OpenBSD network installation.
> >
> > Yes, alas. And especially, for government "legal" interception, where
> > they could legally enlist help from ISPs.
>
> So, intentional (corporate or government agreement with ISP) or
> unintentional (use of M$ on ISP DNS server), could allow the initial
> installation to become compromised, perhaps in a hard-to-detect way.
>
> None of this seems to be solved in the installation guide:
> 	http://openbsd.org/faq/faq4.html
>
> Again, it looks like it might come down to keys or fingerprints and that
> the network install might be depreciated.  Rather, download, verify,
> then install.
>
> -Lars
>
>


--
http://www.glumbert.com/media/shift
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tGvHNNOLnCk
"This officer's men seem to follow him merely out of idle curiosity."
-- Sandhurst officer cadet evaluation.
"Securing an environment of Windows platforms from abuse - external or
internal - is akin to trying to install sprinklers in a fireworks
factory where smoking on the job is permitted."  -- Gene Spafford