login
Search
As previously spelled out in some detail all major NetBSD releases now have a an additional branch created after their release for the tracking of security and critical updates. Examples: (where branches refer to CVS branch names) Release Main Branch Security/Critical Branch ------- ----------- --------------- NetBSD 2.0 netbsd-2 netbsd-2-0 NetBSD 2.1(*) netbsd-2 netbsd-2-1(*) NetBSD 2.2(+) netbsd-2 netbsd-2-2(+) NetBSD 3.0(*) netbsd-3 netbsd-3-0(*) NetBSD 3.1(+) netbsd-3 netbsd-3-1(+) * - upcoming releases + - possible future releases There are currently insufficient resources to do full binary releases of each security/critical branch as they grow on each main branch. Therefore, on an ongoing basis all security/critical branches will be under full source level support for each support main branch. In addition the most recent security/critical branch will have binary updates published as well. This means only the latest security/critical branch (for instance 2.1.1 once 2.1 releases) will have binary updates published for them. All other branches (today 2.0.x) will have source changes applied only. These branches will appear as occasional builds in the NetBSD daily area on ftp.netbsd.org but no other binary releases will be done for them. For any further clarifications and/or questions please feel free to contact the NetBSD Release Engineering team at releng@netbsd.org
[For a full list of these changes, please refer to the mail sent to the tech-pkg mailing list - agc] Summary of Changes to the Packages Collection in January 2006 ============================================================= By my calculations, at the end of January 2006, there were 5853 packages in the Packages Collection, up from 5779 the previous month, a rise of 74. A special "thank you" to Mark Davies for upgrading our KDE packages to version 3.5.1, whilst a number of other packages have been moved around to reflect better their primary category. Notable additions include: archivers/rox-archive, audio/flite, audio/gst-plugins0.10-oss, converters/p5-MIME-Base32, converters/skf, databases/jdbc-postgresql80, databases/jdbc-postgresql81, databases/tinycdb, devel/bzr, devel/cqual, devel/liboil, devel/libwhisker2, devel/mercurial, devel/p5-UNIVERSAL-require, devel/py-cheetah, devel/rox-lib, devel/ruby-gnome2-atk, devel/ruby-gnome2-glib, devel/ruby-gnome2-pango, devel/ruby-ncurses, devel/vtcl, editors/rox-edit, emulators/e-uae, games/billardgl, graphics/pear-Image_Canvas, graphics/pear-Image_Color, graphics/pear-Image_Graph, graphics/ruby-gnome2-gdkpixbuf, graphics/ruby-gnome2-gnomecanvas, graphics/ruby-gnome2-libart, graphics/wxsvg, ham/gpredict, inputmethod/fcitx, inputmethod/gcin, inputmethod/libchewing, lang/spidermonkey, mail/perdition, mail/perdition-bdb, mail/perdition-gdbm, mail/perdition-ldap, mail/perdition-mysql, mail/perdition-odbc, mail/perdition-postgresql, math/pear-Numbers_Roman, math/pear-Numbers_Words, meta-pkgs/ruby-gnome2, misc/autocue, misc/hanzim, misc/p5-Geo-Weather, misc/rox-memo, multimedia/dvdstyler, multimedia/ffmpeg-devel, multimedia/gst-plugins0.10-base, multimedia/gst-plugins0.10-good, multimedia/gstreamer0.10, multimedia/gtranscode, multimedia/replex, net/dnsdoctor, net/kiax, net/p5-Net-Rendezvous, net/snort-prelude, net/ucspi-ssl, print/pdfjam, security/base, security/libprelude, security/libpreludedb, security/prelude-lml, ...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 NetBSD Security Advisory 2008-012 ================================= Topic: Denial of service issues in racoon(8) Version: NetBSD-current: affected NetBSD 4.0: affected NetBSD 3.1.*: not affected NetBSD 3.1: not affected NetBSD 3.0.*: not affected NetBSD 3.0: not affected Severity: Denial of service Fixed: NetBSD-current: August 12, 2008 NetBSD-4-0 branch: August 18, 2008 (4.0.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-4 branch: August 18, 2008 (4.1 will include the fix) pkgsrc: ipsec-tools-0.7.1 corrects the issue Abstract ======== Currently racoon(8) does not remove orphaned ph1s initiated by a remote side. As a result of this a potential denial of service issue can occur. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2008-3652. Technical Details ================= When racoon(8) receives an invalid packet from a peer, it keeps the ph1handle and expects the peer to resend a valid packet. If the peers invalid packet is the first exchange (typically an SA exchange with no valid proposal), the freshly created ph1handle will never be be removed, which is in fact a memory leak. A legitimate peer with invalid configuration, or an attacker, which will send SA exchanges with no valid proposal can create a Denial of Service if it can generate enough ph1handles (racoon will slow down every time it will search for a ph1handle, then may run out of memory). Solutions and Workarounds ========================= Only kernels compiled with the following option are vulnerable to this issue: options IPSEC As a temporary workaround recompile the kernel with the above option commented out. The default NetBSD GENERIC kernels do not have this option enabled. In addition to this the system must be running the racoon(8) daemon which is not enabled by default. An additional workaround can be to add filtering rules to ensure only legitimate peers can send IKE exchanges (port ...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
NetBSD Security Advisory 2008-002
=================================
Topic: Endianness issue in fast_ipsec(4)
Version: NetBSD-current: affected
NetBSD 4.0: not affected
NetBSD 3.1: affected
NetBSD 3.0.*: affected
NetBSD 3.0: affected
NetBSD 2.1: affected
NetBSD 2.0.*: affected
NetBSD 2.0: affected
Severity: IPSEC Security bypass
Fixed: NetBSD-current: October 28, 2007
NetBSD-3-1 branch: November 22, 2007
(3.1.2 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3-0 branch: November 22, 2007
(3.0.4 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3 branch: November 22, 2007
(3.2 will include the fix)
NetBSD-2-1 branch: December 01, 2007
NetBSD-2-0 branch: December 01, 2007
NetBSD-2 branch: December 01, 2007
Abstract
========
If a IPsec association is made between two hosts with different byte orders
it is possible to bypass the IPsec policy. It is possible for this situation
to occur if a NetBSD system is just one host, or both hosts, involved in the
IPsec connection.
Technical Details
=================
The function ipsec4_get_ulp() assumes that ip_off is host endian. This
means that IPsec processing, that is dependent on protocol and/or port number,
can be bypassed.
Solutions and Workarounds
=========================
Only kernels compiled with the following option are vulnerable to this issue:
options FAST_IPSEC
As a temporary workaround recompile the kernel with the above option
commented out. The default NetBSD GENERIC kernels (with the exception
of GENERIC.FAST_IPSEC) do not have this option enabled.
For all NetBSD versions, you need to obtain fixed kernel sources,
rebuild and install the new kernel, and reboot the system.
The fixed source may be obtained from the NetBSD CVS repository.
The following instructions briefly summarise how to upgrade your
kernel. In these instructions, replace:
ARCH with your ...-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 NetBSD Security Advisory 2005-002 ================================= Topic: Local DoS via audio device with specific drivers Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to June 13, 2005 NetBSD 2.0.2: affected NetBSD 2.0.1: affected NetBSD 2.0: affected NetBSD 1.6.2: affected NetBSD 1.6.1: affected NetBSD 1.6: affected Severity: local user with access to audio device can cause kernel trap Fixed: NetBSD-current: June 12, 2005 NetBSD-3.0 branch: June 12, 2005 (3.0 will include the fix) NetBSD-2.0 branch: June 13, 2005 (2.0.3 and 2.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-1.6 branch: June 17, 2005 (1.6.3 will include the fix Abstract ======== With CS4280/4281, or SB Live, or SB PC 512 audio hardware, a local user of the audio device can crash the machine through the ioctl system call. Technical Details ================= The set-parameters ioctl() call of the audio subsystem allows programs to set audio stream parameters as well as the pause state, the internal ring buffer, and audio DMA block size used. When pause state was set to "unpaused" in the same ioctl() call as changing the block size information, playing/recording used to be started without recomputing the buffering parameters. Some drivers would use this information in a division by zero, thus crashing the kernel. The clcs and emuxki drivers are affected. If you do not have Cirrus Logic CS4280/CS4281, SB Live!, or SB PC 512 hardware installed in a system, then this vulnerability does not affect that system. Solutions and Workarounds ========================= The common part of the audio subsystem has been changed to ensure that the device parameters are not left in an uninitialized state. So, while the vulnerability was exposed by certain drivers, the fix is in the device-independent audio code. As a temporary measure, system administrators of multi-user machines may want to disable access to ...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 NetBSD Security Advisory 2006-013 ================================= Topic: sysctl(3) local denial of service Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to March 15, 2005 NetBSD 3.0: affected NetBSD 2.1: affected NetBSD 2.0.*: affected NetBSD 2.0: affected NetBSD 1.6.*: affected NetBSD 1.6: affected Severity: Any local user can crash the system Fixed: NetBSD-current: March 15, 2005 NetBSD-3-0 branch: March 24, 2006 (3.0.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-3 branch: March 24, 2006 NetBSD-2-1 branch: March 24, 2006 (2.1.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-2-0 branch: March 24, 2006 (2.0.4 will include the fix) NetBSD-2 branch: March 24, 2006 Abstract ======== The user supplied buffer where results of the sysctl(3) call are stored is locked into physical memory without checking its size. This way, a malicious user can cause a system lockup by allocating all available physical memory on most systems. Technical Details ================= The system call implementing the sysctl(3) library call tries to lock the user supplied result buffer into physical memory, to avoid the interferences of information collection with other system activity. The size of that buffer is not checked against system limits. The VM system checks whether the virtual address of the buffer is part of the user address space, but since the amount of virtual memory a single user is able to allocate exceeds the available physical memory on most systems, a user can cause a system lockup by exhaustion of physical memory. Solutions and Workarounds ========================= For all NetBSD versions, you need to obtain fixed kernel sources, rebuild and install the new kernel, and reboot the system. The fixed source may be obtained from the NetBSD CVS repository. The following instructions briefly summarise how to upgrade your kernel. In these instructions, replace: ...
[The full list of changes can be found on the pkgsrc-changes mailing list and archives, and a longer version of this mail has been sent to the current-users and tech-pkg mailing lists - agc] Summary of Changes to the Packages Collection in October 2004 ============================================================= Firstly, my apologies for the lack of this service over the last seven months. Still, better late than never... By my calculations, at the end of October 2004, there were 5083 packages in the NetBSD Packages Collection, up from 5011 the previous month, a rise of 72. Notable additions include: abiword-plugins, adtool, ap-php5, ap2-fastcgi, aumix-gtk, bash, bittornado, bittornado-gui, ccze, cgiirc, cppunit, cygwin_esound, cygwin_lib, dbus, dbus-glib, dirmngr, dpkg, eet, evolution-webcal, firefox-gtk2-bin-java, gal20, gg2, gnotime, gnucash-docs, gnugk, gnupg-devel, gsmc, gthumb, inkscape, intel2gas, ion3-devel, libassuan, libltdl, libradius, librfuncs, mail-notification, metacam, msf, MyPasswordSafe, ntfsprogs, p5-CDDB_get, p5-Class-Factory, p5-HTML-LinkExtractor, p5-IO-Util, p5-Lchown, p5-NetAddr-IP, p5-OOTools, p5-POE, p5-Term-ProgressBar, p5-Test-Builder-Tester, p5-Test-Pod, p5-Time-Piece, p5-X11-Protocol, p5-xmltv, php4-shmop, php5-sqlite, pinentry, postgresql74-plpython, ptimetracker, putty, py-InlineEgg, py-pgnotify, rexima, rip, rlpr, rsnapshot, starfighter, strace, sun-jdk15, suse_fileutils, swapd, ttf2pk, tuxpaint-config, uisp, whoson, win32-jdk, and xbomb. Notable updates include: abiword, adzap, ap-fastcgi, ap-ssl, apache, apache2, arts, aumix, bash, biew, bind9, bitlbee, bogofilter, cabextract, ccache, cdparanoia, centericq, cgoban-java, checkpassword-pam, chmlib, clamav, clamsmtp, cppunit, cssc, cue, cvsync, cyrus-imapd22, dbh, dbus, dbus-glib, dcraw, dia, docbook-simple, dosbox, dovecot, drivel, dspam, dync, eel2, ekg, entropy, eog2, epiphany, ethereal, evolution, evolution-data-server, evolution-webcal, evolution14, exim, exim-exiscan, ...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 NetBSD Security Advisory 2010-002 ================================= Topic: OpenSSL TLS renegotiation man in the middle vulnerability Version: NetBSD-current: affected prior to 2009-12-04 NetBSD 5.0: affected NetBSD 4.0.*: affected NetBSD 4.0: affected pkgsrc: openssl package prior to 0.9.8l Severity: Information disclosure Fixed: NetBSD-current: Dec 03, 2009 NetBSD-5-0 branch: Jan 12, 2010 NetBSD-5 branch: Jan 12, 2010 NetBSD-4-0 branch: Jan 12, 2010 NetBSD-4 branch: Jan 12, 2010 pkgsrc 2009Q4: openssl-0.9.8l corrects this issue Please note that NetBSD releases prior to 4.0 are no longer supported. It is recommended that all users upgrade to a supported release. Abstract ======== An error in the OpenSSL TLS session renegotiation allows a remote attacker to intercept communication and conduct a Man-in-the-Middle attack on TLS sessions. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2009-3555 and CERT Vulnerability Note VU#120541. Technical Details ================= A design problem exists in the renegotiation feature for TLS sessions as implemented by the version of OpenSSL shipped with NetBSD. As session renegotiation handshakes are not properly associated with an existing connection, an unauthenticated attacker can initiate a renegotiation in order to allow a man-in-the-middle attack, which may allow the attacker to inject plaintext into the communication. Solutions and Workarounds ========================= The solution to this problem is to disable TLS session renegotiation for now by applying the provided patches or updating NetBSD to a version including the fix. The following instructions describe how to upgrade your OpenSSL binaries by updating your source tree and rebuilding and installing a new version of OpenSSL. * NetBSD-current: Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2009-12-04 should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated ...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
NetBSD Security Advisory 2007-006
=================================
Topic: Local panics in display driver code
Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to July 28, 2007
NetBSD 4.0_BETA2 affected
NetBSD 3.1: affected
NetBSD 3.0.*: affected
NetBSD 3.0: affected
NetBSD 2.1: not affected
NetBSD 2.0.*: not affected
NetBSD 2.0: not affected
Severity: Local system crash
Fixed: NetBSD-current: July 28, 2007
NetBSD-4 branch: July 30, 2007
(4.0 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3-1 branch August 6, 2007
(3.1.1 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3-0 branch: August 6, 2007
(3.0.3 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3 branch: August 6, 2007
Abstract
========
A local user can cause the system to panic by passing out of bounds
values to display driver allocattr functions via an ioctl call.
This vulnerability has been assigned CVE reference CVE-2007-3654.
Technical Details
=================
vga_allocattr uses integer arguments as indicies into arrays of colors.
The vga_allocattr function does not check to see whether these arguments
are within the bounds of the arrays.
Due to the lack of bounds checking a negative or large value can be passed
to vga_allocattr which will cause it to access arbitrary memory locations,
resulting in a panic.
Other display driver functions are also vulnerable to this issue.
Solutions and Workarounds
=========================
To rectify these problems a kernel built from sources containing the
fixes must be installed and the system rebooted.
The following instructions describe how to upgrade your kernel
by updating your source tree and rebuilding and installing a new version
of the kernel.
For more information on how to do this, see:
http://www.NetBSD.org/guide/en/chap-kernel.html
* NetBSD-current:
Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2007-07-28
should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2007-07-29 or later.
The ...-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 NetBSD Security Advisory 2008-009 ================================= Topic: BIND cache poisoning Version: NetBSD-current: affected NetBSD 4.0: affected NetBSD 3.1.*: affected NetBSD 3.1: affected NetBSD 3.0.*: affected NetBSD 3.0: affected bind 8.x packages bind 9.4.x packages prior to 9.4.2pl1 bind 9.5.x packages prior to 9.5.0pl1 Severity: Remote DNS cache poisoning Fixed: NetBSD-current: July 10, 2008 NetBSD-4-0 branch: July 16, 2008 (4.0.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-4 branch: July 16, 2008 (4.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-3-1 branch: July 24, 2008 (3.1.2 will include the fix) NetBSD-3-0 branch: July 24, 2008 (3.0.4 will include the fix) NetBSD-3 branch: July 24, 2008 (3.2 will include the fix) pkgsrc: bind-9.4.2pl1 corrects the issue bind-9.5.0pl1 corrects the issue Abstract ======== Deficiencies in the DNS protocol can allow attackers to inject poisoned responses into a caching nameserver. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE reference CVE-2008-1447 and CERT Vulnerability Note VU#800113. Technical Details ================= New cache poisoning techniques have been discovered by Dan Kaminsky which allow an attacker to poison a cache. This vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker in a short amount of time. For further information see: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/800113 http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/forgery-resilience.php http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1447 http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/docs/FAQ-about-random-query-issue.php Solutions and Workarounds ========================= It is recommended that NetBSD users of vulnerable versions update their binaries. If you are unable to update BIND in the base operating system there are fixed versions in pkgsrc that can be used. The following points should be taken into consideration when assessing this issue: * Do not ...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Recently, Google announced that there will be another instance of their popular ``Summer of Code'' program in 2009. The NetBSD Project has participated in this program as a mentoring organization since its conception in 2005 [1], and hopes again to be fortunate enough to take part in this year's iteration. As part of our preparation for the Summer of Code 2009, we have begun reviewing and updating our list of suggested projects[2] and would like to invite all interested students to likewise begin their research and start discussions with the possible mentors as well as on our public mailing lists. Stay tuned for further updates! [1] For a detailed summary of NetBSD's participation in 2008, please see http://www.netbsd.org/foundation/press/soc2008-summary.html [2] http://www.NetBSD.org/contrib/soc-projects.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (NetBSD) iD8DBQFJhxxvfFtkr68iakwRAmtSAJ9Nfpu7SObYfdeKbdxnMiujC9SMbwCgq82a b4GbxkLmgZWvZcWJUB1PtzY= =tjEc -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
On behalf of the NetBSD release engineering team, I'd like to announce the beginning of the NetBSD 4.0 release process. NetBSD 4.0 will be the twelfth major release of the NetBSD Operating System. As some of you may have noticed, NetBSD 4.0_BETA was branched on August 8, 2006 (UTC), and the beta-testing process has officially begun. It is expected that we will remain in beta until approximately October 1, at which time the first Release Candidate will be tagged, and binaries and ISO images will be made available within a few days. New release candidates will be tagged approximately every two weeks following, to address any critical bugs which may arise. It is anticipated that at least three Release Candidates will be required, putting the approximate release date of NetBSD 4.0 around December 1. PLEASE NOTE, this is independent of the release process for NetBSD 3.1, which is also occurring during this time. You can check the progress and status of the beta at: http://www.netbsd.org/releng/releng-4.html HOW YOU CAN HELP ---------------- Please test NetBSD 4.0_BETA on your hardware! A lot of work has gone into getting us this far, but we don't have access to every piece of hardware out there. If you've used previous releases of NetBSD, please make sure all your devices continue to work; if you have spare machines, please test the installation procedures. With your help, this will be the best release of NetBSD yet! As always, problems should be reported using send-pr, or you may use the web submission form at:=20 http://www.netbsd.org/cgi-bin/sendpr.cgi?gndb=3Dnetbsd GETTING THE BETA ---------------- Getting source code via anonymous CVS: -------------------------------------- To switch your existing tree to track NetBSD-4.0_BETA, use the "netbsd-4" tag: cd /usr/src cvs update -rnetbsd-4 -dP For more information about anonymous CVS, see http://www.netbsd.org/Documentation/current/#using-anoncvs Getting pre-built ...
The pkgsrc-2006Q2 Release ========================= The pkgsrc developers are very proud to announce the new pkgsrc-2006Q2 release, which has support for more packages than previous releases. As well as updated versions of many packages, the infrastructure of pkgsrc itself has been improved for better platform and compiler support, and also for enhanced security. At the same time, the pkgsrc-2006Q1 release has been deprecated, and continuing engineering starts on the pkgsrc-2006Q2 release. Some highlights of the new pkgsrc-2006Q2 release are: + many, many packages have been updated to newer versions, to take advantage of fixes and improved functionality. This includes + gnome-2.14 + kde-3.5.3 + opera-9.0 + perl-5.8.8 + postgresql-8.1.4 + thunderbird-1.5.0.4 + split the openldap package into constituent parts + reorganised the webmin packages and plugins + revamped most of the pkgsrc infrastructure to make it much more efficient and maintainable + the addition of some pertinent bright, shiny packages such as seamonkey, pgadmin3, ggrab, jack, mpeg4ip, jamvm, uucp, cherokee, sgb, javacc, spl, slony1, dtach + a considerable number of fixes for much better DragonFly BSD operation, which will also benefit a lot of pkgsrc platforms, with thanks to Joerg Sonnenberger The full list of platforms supported by pkgsrc is: AIX, BSD/OS, Darwin (Mac OS X), DragonFly BSD, FreeBSD, IRIX, Interix, Linux, NetBSD, OSF1, OpenBSD, and SunOS (Solaris). NetBSD-1.6 has been declared end-of-life, and pkgsrc will now be de-emphasising support for it, too. We would also like to add support for more platforms - please get in touch if you, too, are interested. + following DragonFly BSD's adoption of pkgsrc as their packaging system, Joerg Sonnenberger has continued to make a lot of changes, which include a number of modifications for packages which use POSIX threading libraries, and also enhanced support for gcc 3.4 and above + as mentioned before, the ...
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 NetBSD Security Advisory 2009-005 ================================= Topic: Plaintext Recovery Attack Against SSH Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to June 8, 2009 NetBSD 5.0: source prior to June 30, 2009 NetBSD 4.0.1: source prior to June 30, 2009 NetBSD 4.0: source prior to June 30, 2009 pkgsrc: openssh packages prior to 5.2 Severity: Information leakage from SSH sessions Fixed: NetBSD-current: June 8, 2009 NetBSD-5 branch: June 30, 2009 (5.0.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-4 branch: June 30, 2009 (4.1 will include the fix) NetBSD-4-0 branch: June 30, 2009 (4.0.2 will include the fix) pkgsrc 2009Q1: openssh-5.2 corrects this issue Please note that NetBSD releases prior to 4.0 are no longer supported. It is recommended that all users upgrade to a supported release. Abstract ======== A defect exists in SSH protocol that allows active attackers to recover plaintext from an SSH session if a CBC mode cipher is in use. Updated versions of OpenSSH mitigate this problem. http://secunia.com/advisories/32760/ http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Docs/Vulnerability_Advisory_SSH.txt http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/958563 Technical Details ================= The CBC cipher mode of the SSH protocol allows a remote attacker to recover up to 32 bits of plaintext data from an existing SSH session by sending specially crafted packets. This can be mitigated either through changes of the sshd_config and ssh_config files or by updating to the latest version of OpenSSH. http://secunia.com/advisories/32760/ http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Docs/Vulnerability_Advisory_SSH.txt http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/958563 Solutions and Workarounds ========================= The problem can be mitigated by disabling the CBC mode ciphers using the following directive in sshd_config and ssh_config: Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour,aes128-cbc,aes256-cbc This makes the CBC ciphers most ...
The pkgsrc-2004Q4 Branch ======================== The pkgsrc developers are very proud to announce the new pkgsrc-2004Q4 branch, which has support for more packages, and on more platforms, than previous branches. As well as updated versions of many packages, the infrastructure of pkgsrc itself has been improved for better platform and compiler support, and for forthcoming development. At the same time, the pkgsrc-2004Q3 branch has been deprecated, and continuing engineering starts on the pkgsrc-2004Q4 branch. Some highlights of the new pkgsrc-2004Q4 branch are: + support for new platforms in pkgsrc o OSF1 o DragonFly BSD The full list of platforms supported by pkgsrc is now: AIX, BSD/OS, Darwin (MacOS X), DragonFly, FreeBSD, IRIX, Interix, Linux, NetBSD, OSF1, OpenBSD, SunOS (Solaris), and UnixWare + improved infrastructure for non-NetBSD platforms, including 64-bit variants of some operating systems, whilst continuing to keep NetBSD as the main target platform + improved support for non-gcc compilers + continuing engineering on the "stable" branches of pkgsrc has been much improved + constant bulk building on a number of platforms (see the pkgsrc-bulk mailing list) has improved our ability to identify potential areas of concern, and to correct them sooner. It has also improved our ability to make binary packages available + the number of packages has been increased to 5209; the number of supported platforms has been raised to 13. NetBSD, on all its supported architectures, is considered to be one pkgsrc platform. + and many, many packages have been updated to newer versions, to take advantage of fixes and improved functionality. This includes o gnome-2.8.1 o kde-3.3.2 o mysql-4.1.7 o perl-5.8.5 o postgres-7.4.6 o python-2.4 o openldap-2.2.18 As always, we'd like to encourage users of the packages collection to install and run pkgsrc/security/audit-packages at least every day - this will provide notification of any packages ...
I'd like to introduce two new developers.
Work Area: hpcmips
Greg Hughes:
http://www.student.math.uwaterloo.ca/~gl2hughe/hpcmips/
IBM z50 TrackPoint on VR4121 Driver Support
Katsuomi Hamajima:
VR4121 Audio Interface Unit Driver Support
and amigappc,dreamcast,playstation2 support.
welcome welcome.
--
jun ebihara,from TOKYO
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 We are upgrading the hardware on ftp.netbsd.org on Saturday, June 29, 9am Pacific (12 noon Eastern) to upgrade hardware and its OS revision. I hope to keep the downtime to less than 4 hours, but it depends entirely on how fast the data can be copied from the old to the new machine. However, I'm planning for a 8 hour window in case something goes wrong. Mail will be sent when things return to service. - --Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (NetBSD) Comment: See http://www.flame.org/~explorer/pgp for my keys iD8DBQE9HBgGl6Nz7kJWYWYRAjXBAJ0Q8X+jxU0jwO5dt7G6Tx5K61u6KACfWiFI CXvuNuUMfkqSgoQAGHk4Q1Y= =RGQz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
The NetBSD project is pleased to welcome the following new developers: * Daniel de Kok (daniel@NetBSD.org), who will be working on the NetBSD Guide and website documentation. * Jochen Kunz (jkunz@NetBSD.org), who will be working on device drivers, hppa and rs/6000. * Soren Jacobsen (snj@NetBSD.org), who will be working on the NetBSD Packages Collection. Welcome aboard! --=20 http://www.netbsd.org - Multiarchitecture OS, no hype required.
It is with great pleasure that I am able to officially announce the new NetBSD Project Blog: http://blog.NetBSD.org The NetBSD Project Blog allows us to let you, the community, know about new developments in NetBSD and pkgsrc. The blog supplements our existing netbsd-announce mailing list and the "Recent Changes and News" webpage. We hope it will provide you with greater insight into the future of NetBSD. For those that tweet - so do we - http://www.twitter.com/NetBSD Mark Weinem on behalf of the NetBSD Marketing Team
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
NetBSD Security Advisory 2006-005
=================================
Topic: bridge memory disclosure
Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to January 17, 2006
NetBSD 3.0: affected
NetBSD 2.1: affected
NetBSD 2.0.*: affected
NetBSD 2.0: affected
NetBSD 1.6.*: affected
NetBSD 1.6: affected
Severity: Kernel sensitive information can be disclosed
Fixed: NetBSD-current: January 17, 2006
NetBSD-3-0 branch: February 12, 2006
(3.0.1 will include the fix)
NetBSD-3 branch: February 12, 2006
NetBSD-2-1 branch: February 12, 2006
(2.1.1 will include the fix)
NetBSD-2-0 branch: February 12, 2006
(2.0.4 will include the fix)
NetBSD-2 branch: February 12, 2006
Abstract
========
An information disclosure issue exists in if_bridge(4) code.
Technical Details
=================
The bridge(4) ioctl(2) calls did not zero out the stack memory used
to temporarily store the results of the ioctl(2) requests before
copying them back to the requesting process. Thus portions of the
kernel stack memory could be exposed to the calling process. The
impact of this is minor since:
1. the number of bytes exposed is small
2. the location and therefore the contents cannot be controlled
by the calling process and
3. the buffer is partially overwritten by the results
Solutions and Workarounds
=========================
For all NetBSD versions, you need to obtain fixed kernel sources,
rebuild and install the new kernel, and reboot the system.
The fixed source may be obtained from the NetBSD CVS repository.
The following instructions briefly summarise how to upgrade your
kernel. In these instructions, replace:
ARCH with your architecture (from uname -m), and
KERNCONF with the name of your kernel configuration file.
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install the kernel:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P sys/net/if_bridge.c
# ./build.sh ...Puget Sound Technology, a provider of open source consulting services
and Binary Updates for NetBSD, is teaching a hands-on, three-day class
covering the fundamentals of NetBSD system administration.
NetBSD System Administration Training
March 4 - 6, 2003
Phoenix, Arizona area
US$1170.00 ($994.50 if ordered by February 1.)
This intensive boot camp training is designed to provide the IT
professional or beginning system administrator with the skills
required to install and maintain NetBSD. Students will perform a
series of hands-on exercises to install, administer, configure, and
secure NetBSD (and generic Linux and BSD).
Course Features:
* Complimentary NetBSD boxed CD set.
* Complimentary lunches included daily.
* Preview of "Getting Started with NetBSD" book.
* Small classes with one-on-one interaction.
* Hands-on training, one system per student.
* Certificate of course completion.
Course Topics:
* interactive operating system installation (CDs provided)
* basic filesystem creation and maintenance
* system startup configurations (using rc.conf and rc.d)
* networking setup and troubleshooting
* user and group administration
* installing new software using packages (pkgsrc and pre-built)
* setting up a DNS caching and authoritative DNS server (using BIND)
* setting up basic packet filter and NAT (Network Address
Translation)
* beginning email server configuration (using Postfix)
* Apache HTTPD webserver installation and configuration for virtual
domains. (Note: an Apache Web Server Administration class is being
taught after this course. Both classes can be registered for a
discount price.)
* Unix security concepts
* basic system "hardening" techniques
* customizing and building the kernel
* updating a NetBSD system
Seating is limited. For course availability, further details,
and to register, please contact Puget Sound Technology by ...The regular daily builds for NetBSD have begun again and are available for public consumption. Currently these will run on a continuous basis and provide builds of all major branches and the main trunk. Builds take approx. 30 hours to complete for a given cycle so it's expected 5-6 may be done during any given week. At this time -current (the HEAD of the main CVS tree) will be built most often but all branches will be built within a 2.5 week run of the cycle. Output can be found on ftp.netbsd.org in ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD-daily and logs + summarys can be found at: http://releng.netbsd.org/ If there are questions/comments/concerns please feel free to send mail to releng@netbsd.org with these. Thanks James
The NetBSD Project is pleased to welcome the following new developers: * John Heasley (heas@NetBSD.org), who will be working on X and the sparc64 port. * Dennis I. Chernoivanov (cdi@NetBSD.org), who will be working on the cobalt port. * Eric Gillespie (epg@NetBSD.org), who will be working on pkgsrc. * Charles Blundell (cb@NetBSD.org), who will be working on security, auditing and patching. Welcome aboard!
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 * Summer of Code applications period started For the fourth consecutive time in a row, the NetBSD Project is proud to be one of the mentoring organizations in Google's Summer of Code program. The student applications period has started, and we would like to encourage interested students to submit their applications to participate and help make NetBSD even better! Working with our mentoring NetBSD developers on a complex project offers an exciting opportunity for all students to not only get paid to gain valuable software engineering experience, to network with a large community of professionals or to lay the foundation for future research, but it's also a fun way to contribute to and even become part of a large Open Source project. A number of concrete suggestions for Summer of Code projects within NetBSD is available at http://www.netbsd.org/contrib/soc-projects.html All projects there are rated with an estimated level of difficulty and appropriate contacts. We encourage all students to discuss their proposal prior to submission on our public mailing lists, with the primary contact listed on that page or on #netbsd-code on IRC. Note that we also invite students to submit proposals for projects that are not explicitly listed on that page. Some of the questions to which we would like to see the answers in your application are listed at http://www.netbsd.org/contrib/soc-application.html Good luck to all students - we are looking forward to working with you this summer! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (NetBSD) iD8DBQFH6IuffFtkr68iakwRAnSHAJ0bH0BUTC7pBew60Cts+DnCF4so7QCeOGp+ x9D7sSYN0QWRD43vLcm7hTo= =nSeG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
The NetBSD core team has been working together for two years in its
present form, and, such are the stresses of the job, some changes have
become necessary. We'd like to thank the members of the core team who
have spent a lot of time and effort looking after the technical
direction of the NetBSD project, and steering it to where it is today.
After six years of service, Frank van der Linden and Luke Mewburn will
be standing down. Simply saying "thank you" seems a bit mean - these
guys have helped steer and guide the NetBSD project to where it is
today. NetBSD wouldn't be the same without them.
Our new core members bring with them their own skills and enthusiasm,
and they are an asset to the NetBSD project as a whole.
The Board of Directors of The NetBSD Foundation would like to announce
that the new NetBSD core team will consist of:
Allen Briggs (briggs@NetBSD.org)
Christos Zoulas (christos@NetBSD.org)
Matt Thomas (matt@NetBSD.org)
Valeriy E. Ushakov (uwe@NetBSD.org)
Yamamoto Takashi (yamt@NetBSD.org)
Alistair Crooks
on behalf of the Board of Directors
The NetBSD Foundation
