Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its
inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive
information.
CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 6faa825..5748901 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -1520,8 +1520,8 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len,
bo->bound = 1;
if (proc_dir) {
- /* unique socket address as filename */
- sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock);
+ /* socket inode as filename */
+ sprintf(bo->procname, "%lx", sock_i_ino(sk));
bo->bcm_proc_read = proc_create_data(bo->procname, 0644,
proc_dir,
&bcm_proc_fops, sk);
--
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