Adrian Bunk wrote:No in this case /dev/urandom is the wrong choice. You should seed then some standard RND with the time,pid as is the classical way and not use any precious entropy. Yes some programs don't do that, but they're wrong and actually slightly dangerous. Even the cryptographic programs normally use /dev/urandom to get session keys etc. That is because they are definitely concerned about local DoS. Just strace your ssh daemon or your SSL web server to see what I mean. Yes, but if you read the context of that patch it commented out the code that accessed /dev/urandom! Please reread my analysis of the issue. If you have already entropy in the pool the additional feed doesn't change anything. And if you don't it still stays the same. -Andi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
| Srivatsa Vaddagiri | Re: [PATCH, RFC] reimplement flush_workqueue() |
| Greg KH | [GIT PATCH] driver core patches against 2.6.24 |
| debian developer | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Rafael J. Wysocki | 2.6.26-rc7-git2: Reported regressions from 2.6.25 |
| Alexey Dobriyan | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
| David Miller | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Ilpo Järvinen | Re: [bug] stuck localhost TCP connections, v2.6.26-rc3+ |
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