Rick Jones wrote:The issue is with being externally observable and controllable, or, with some irq mitigation schemes, be made /too regular/. Interrupts (or timed mitigation events) may be triggered by the outside world, which makes it a very short path from remote attacker to local kernel entropy pool. Finally, with severe load, there are little or no interrupts thanks to heavy mitigation, which means your entropy pool may be externally DoS'd. Or at the very least, when your entropy needs to be INCREASED (due to heavy workload due to heavy traffic), your incoming entropy DECREASES due to decreased interrupts. [I just realized that last one. Heck, I'm even convincing myself even more its a bad idea] Jeff -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
| Ingo Molnar | Re: x86: 4kstacks default |
| Gabriel C | modpost errors ( Re: 2.6.23-rc6-mm1) |
| Bart Van Assche | Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
| Press, Jonathan | RE: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interface foron access scann... |
git: | |
| David Miller | Re: iptables very slow after commit784544739a25c30637397ace5489eeb6e15d7d49 |
| Natalie Protasevich | [BUG] New Kernel Bugs |
| Jarek Poplawski | [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 13/37] dccp: Deprecate Ack Ratio sysctl |
