> Am Sonntag, den 02.01.2011, 23:49 +0100 schrieb Eric Dumazet:
> > Le dimanche 02 janvier 2011 à 23:39 +0100,
stefani@seibold.net a écrit :
> > > +
> > > +/*
> > > + * Create a new destination descriptor for the given IPV4 address and port
> > > + */
> > > +static struct udpcp_dest *new_dest(struct sock *sk, __be32 addr, __be16 port)
> > > +{
> > > + struct udpcp_dest *dest;
> > > + struct udpcp_sock *usk = udpcp_sk(sk);
> > > +
> > > + if (usk->connections >= udpcp_max_connections)
> > > + return NULL;
> > > +
> > > + dest = kzalloc(sizeof(*dest), sk->sk_allocation);
> > > +
> > > + if (dest) {
> > > + usk->connections++;
> > > + skb_queue_head_init(&dest->xmit);
> > > + dest->addr = addr;
> > > + dest->port = port;
> > > + dest->ackmode = UDPCP_ACK;
> > > + list_add_tail(&dest->list, &usk->destlist);
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + return dest;
> > > +}
> > > +
> >
> > Hmm, so 'connections' is increased, never decreased.
> >
> > This seems a fatal flaw in this protocol, since a malicious user can
> > easily fill the list with garbage, and block regular communications.
>
> You are right, there is now way to detect which connection is no longer
> needed. I have not designed this protocol, so i cannot fix it.
>
> But in our environment this will be used together with an firewall
> and/or ipsec. In this case it it safe.
>
