> From: Andi Kleen [mailto:andi@firstfloor.org]
quoted text > Sent: Friday, December 04, 2009 9:14 AM
>
> > "bad stuff" would be the execution of any code (or use of any data that affects execution)
> that was not verified by tboot. As long as panic() is within the code ranges MAC'ed by tboot
> (see above), it would be covered. Do you know of some panic() code paths that are outside of
> this?
>
> Not code path, but the code called by panic (console drivers, debuggers etc.)
> can well use data that is stored >4GB
>
> This can include structures with indirect pointers, like notifier chains.
>
> Notifier chains have a special checker than can check
> for <4GB, but there are other call vectors too.
Since, as you pointed out in a previous email, it is doubtful that there will be any user-visible output at this point, we can change this path to a tboot reset (which will give us some serial output at least). Is it going to be similarly unsafe to do a printk()?
quoted text > > > > > checksummed by tboot, attacker may be able to hijack code execution
> > > > > and bypass your protection, no?
> > > > Yes, kernel code is audited by tboot before resume.
> > >
> > > So no, you did not audit do_suspend_lowlevel to make sure it does not
> > > follow function pointers. Bad.
> >
> > We aren't aware of any code or data used by the resume path that is outside of the tboot-
> MAC'ed regions above--if you can point out any then we will gladly address them.
>
> Code coverage is not enough, you need data coverage too. If someone
> modifies kernel data it's typically easy to subvert code as a next step.
Agreed, which is why I said "code or data". We'll take another look at the couple of fns that are within this path, but if you have any specific examples can you please post them.
quoted text >
>
> -Andi
> --
>
ak@linux.intel.com -- Speaking for myself only.
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RE: [PATCH] intel_txt: add s3 userspace memory integrity v ... , Cihula, Joseph , (Fri Dec 4, 10:41 am)