2.6.26-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
[ Upstream commit 30c2235cbc477d4629983d440cdc4f496fec9246 ]
The structure used for SCTP_AUTH_KEY option contains a
length that needs to be verfied to prevent buffer overflow
conditions. Spoted by Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++++
net/sctp/socket.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c
+++ b/net/sctp/auth.c
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ static struct sctp_auth_bytes *sctp_auth
{
struct sctp_auth_bytes *key;
+ /* Verify that we are not going to overflow INT_MAX */
+ if ((INT_MAX - key_len) < sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes))
+ return NULL;
+
/* Allocate the shared key */
key = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes) + key_len, gfp);
if (!key)
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -3054,6 +3054,11 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(stru
goto out;
}
+ if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, authkey->sca_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && authkey->sca_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
--
--
