On Wed, Aug 06, 2008 at 12:07:57PM +0100, tvrtko.ursulin@sophos.com wrote:The list of requirements you came up with was a very low-level set of requirements. This is why Al Viro called it not much better than we want a bunch of hooks here, here, and here. What is needed is the high-level set of requirements --- which in the case of security fixes, really needs to start with a threat model (or threat models). See my previous message, where I tried to help you guys out on this. There are scenarios such as "The Linux Desktop", where the Clueless User may be tricked to run random binaries. Then there is the "The Linux Fileserver", where users may upload malware via CIFS, NFS, et. al, but there aren't any Clueless Users to start the malware running on said Linux Fileserver, etc. When you do threat analysis you need to know whether the malware is likely to have compromised root (superuser) access or not. Etc. Low-level requirements are things like "this code must take the number, multiply by it 7, and add 42". High-level requirements answer the question, why the heck are you trying to do this in the first place?!? - Ted --
| David Miller | Re: [PATCH] Stop pmac_zilog from abusing 8250's device numbers. |
| Andrew Morton | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Greg Kroah-Hartman | [PATCH 010/196] Chinese: add translation of Codingstyle |
| Jan Engelhardt | intel iommu (Re: -mm merge plans for 2.6.23) |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
| David Miller | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| Jarek Poplawski | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Felix von Leitner | socket api problem: can't bind an ipv6 socket to ::ffff:0.0.0.0 |
git: | |
