> And this can be done from userland with the preload: the "workaround"
Scripts
Attempts to screen content
Exec occuring after ld.so is compromised
Is there anything however that cannot be done with SELinux if you added
the ability to block an open and kick it upwards (including the open of
an exec binary)
It seems you would then get a transition from a label of 'trusted' to
'untrusted_unverified' and an open of untrusted_unverified can (depending
on the SELinux rule) then block, trap upwards and continue according to a
userspace response.
At that point all the questions like 'what do I want to scan for' become
SELinux questions and we already have all the technology to do stuff like
'only scan for samba' or 'only scan for httpd and cgi' and do it
efficiently.
The cache then becomes the labels which are already part of the fs and
our existing labelling and context management.
Alan
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