Cliffe wrote:
quoted text > If we had stackable LSMs then the required functionality could simply
> be built into the LSM interface. Then the anti-malware would simply
> stack itself with other LSMs. In my opinion this is a perfect example
> for the argument of stackable LSMs.
No argument from me.
quoted text > So far we mainly have LSMs which provide an extra access control
> mechanism (in addition to DAC).
Yes. This is the design center for the LSM.
quoted text > IMHO, Ideally DAC could be another stackable LSM (enabled by default).
Yup. Search the archives for "authoritative hooks".
quoted text > Other security schemes such as intrusion detection,
> firewalls/netfilter, anti-malware, and application restrictions
> (sandboxes such as jails or finer grained restrictions such as
> AppArmor) could all register LSMs onto the stack.
Stacking is easy for files. It's a real pain in the backside for UDP
packets.
quoted text > Additional infrastructure would be necessary. Permissible security
> remains a item of contention. Perhaps I am naive but I think most LSMs
> could work based on accept/reject. Where every LSM must accept an
> action in order for it to be carried out.
Please propose patches.
quoted text > MHO,
Oh, humility isn't all it's cracked up to be. Show us all up and
write the code. I'm serious, I don't think there's anyone here who
would object to a really good stacking scheme.
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Re: [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interface for on acce... , Casey Schaufler , (Mon Aug 4, 11:44 pm)