On Mon, 2008-08-04 at 20:26 -0400, Christoph Hellwig wrote:What? You want to write and in kernel scanner for Window viruses? I don't know when files get closed and can't preemptively scan to make sure it is clean for the next open? Any writes are going to invalidate the allow/deny cache.... The data connected with the file being opened must as reasonably as possible be the data the 'scanner' looks at. Some foolish early discussion wanted to do simplistic things like pass a pathname to a scanner and have it call open on that path name. I'm willing to entertain any other method of making the scanner look at the data the process is about to get. What? it allows a process to open a file that contains malware, how is that horrible. If a process says "I want to see malware" it can then see malware. Doesn't in any way affect other processes or the system security as a whole. If 'bad' data gets into a file its going to get blocked from everything that doesn't actively choose to see it. Go read the long explainations, I already rules out path based inclusions. I'm leaving exclusions up for grabs since I don't see it weakening the security model. --
| Davide Libenzi | [patch 7/8] fdmap v2 - implement sys_socket2 |
| Benjamin Herrenschmidt | Re: [PATCH] Remove process freezer from suspend to RAM pathway |
| Greg Kroah-Hartman | [PATCH 011/196] sysfs: Fix a copy-n-paste typo in comment |
| Greg KH | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Jarek Poplawski | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 0/37] dccp: Feature negotiation - last call for comments |
| Rémi Denis-Courmont | [PATCH] USB host CDC Phonet network interface driver |
| David Miller | [GIT]: Networking |
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