On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 05:45:34PM +0300, Markku Savela wrote:Well, because that's not the what the POSIX draft specification (and the rest of the Unix industry who were striving to meet the US Department of Defense's "B2 by '92" initiative) ended up implementing. The reason for that was to avoid bugs where a program that wasn't expecting to be setuid (or just written by a stupid progammer) exec's some program which wasn't expecting to have root privileges then bad things happen. The classic example of this was running the mail program, which was setuid or setgid to the mail user/group, and then typing "!/bin/sh" which would exec a shell running with those privileges (because the mail program didn't know to drop its privileges). So in the capabilities model, the capabilities do *not* inherit unless the a particular file explicitly states that it should inherit the capabilities. It's the principle of least privilege taken to its logical conclusion. - Ted --
| Greg KH | [GIT PATCH] driver core patches against 2.6.24 |
| Alan Cox | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Bart Van Assche | Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
| Jan Engelhardt | intel iommu (Re: -mm merge plans for 2.6.23) |
git: | |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
| David Miller | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| David Miller | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| Evgeniy Polyakov | Re: [BUG] New Kernel Bugs |
