On Mon, Aug 18, 2008 at 11:44 AM, <david@lang.hm> wrote:Matters directly for 2 cases to the Linux system itself. First case HIDS spotting alteration to something like if someone places signature files on a NTFS partition for some reason when it was placed there it was X permission now its Y better inform the user that this has happened. Without being able to see the disk permissions this could be missed due to no translation of permissions to vfs. We have Ubuntu users in this mix they will put it on NTFS if they are low of disk space. Second case is file system mount options changing the files that are displayed in vfs so a full partition scan by a scanner running in Linux is a full disk scan not some files missed here or there due to hidden permissions and processing in the file system driver. Next bits I think is not understanding how some defence tech works and lack of experience in forensics. Full hids monitoring does not depend on known how the OS will interpret it picking up that month after month something has never been changed and then all of a sudden something is changed to alert you to look deeper. Its more of a warning bell so that works without ever understanding 100 percent how the permissions work. When compared to other machines setup in the same kind of way more fine defects can turn up. Same software Same applications same profiles sent from server should be a 99 percent match other than SID number being different. Most of that variation from each other should turn up in the first week of usage. HIDS is basically anything stepping out side normal go off. Doing forensic recoveries on things I have learnt yes you can duplicate how a OS will interpret its disk permissions. Complexity is directly linked to how tidy the OS's permission system is. Windows is surprisingly not that bad. Linux and BSD are level 10 pricks due to the fact config file over here may completely provide access where disk permissions say no then you have the LSM permissions to over lay. So its a pain in tail to duplicate how some OS's would interpret it but 100 percent do able if you know the software on top even how that reacts is predictable without running it. Forensic working out a attack you do it. Since running the OS only makes the threat active worse let the threat cover its trail. Lot of white listing is performed in the process to confirm that programs have not been messed with. So there configuration files processing can be trusted. Its simply another myth that it cannot be done. Off-line scanning can be done if the scanner is setup for it yes more complex process having to read stuff like the windows registry that is poorly documented. For fully documented OS's 100 its nothing more than processing time. Complete work out of course need the applications on top that is of course documentation of operation again. So no magical non understandable stuff here. Peter Dolding. --
| Amit K. Arora | [RFC] Heads up on sys_fallocate() |
| Tarkan Erimer | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Greg Kroah-Hartman | [PATCH 001/196] Chinese: Add the known_regression URI to the HOWTO |
git: | |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
| Jarek Poplawski | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| David Miller | [GIT]: Networking |
| Matheos Worku | 2.6.24 BUG: soft lockup - CPU#X |
