> On Thu, 14 Aug 2008, Eric Paris wrote:
quoted text
> 
> >>But Pavel is raising a good question.  In Eric's proposed threat
> >>model, he claimed the only thing that he was trying to solve was
> >>"scanning".  Just file scanning.  That implies no root privileges, but
> >>it also implied that he wasn't worried about malware running with user
> >>privileges, either.  Presumbly, that would be caught and stopped by
> >>the file scanner before the malware had a chance to run; that is the
> >>execve(2) system call would also be blocked until the executable was
> >>scanned.
> >>
> >>So if that is the threat model, then the only thing libmalware.so
> >>doesn't solve is knfsd access, and it should be evaluated on that
> >>basis.  If the threat model *does* include malware which is **not**
> >>caught by the AV scanner, and is running with user privileges, then
> >>there are a whole host of other attacks that we have to worry about.
> >>So let's be real clear, up front, what the threat model is, and avoid
> >>changing the model around to rule out solutions that don't fit the
> >>initially preconceived one.  That's how you get to the TSA
> >>confiscating water bottles in airport security lines.
> >
> >No, I'm not claiming to protect against running processes.  I'll leave
> >that for SELinux.
> >
> >I haven't seen this supposed libmalware.so so take anything I say with a
> >grain of sand.  But I take it that the solutions to the problems are
> >'don't do that.'
> 
> libmalware.so is shorthand for 'have a userspace library do the scanning 
> and handle the open'

(snip). Agreed, you explained it better than I would.
								Pavel

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