(this was posted in linux.kernel, before I realized there was a
linux.kernel.malware. Hope it helps your discussion)
(FYI. Dazuko may have trailblazed some of the issues now under
discussion re: libmalware.so. It has worked well for me. It used to be
an LKM, it is now a source patch. It is used in a number of commercial
products)
<http://dazuko.dnsalias.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page>
"A Virtual Device Driver to Allow Online File Access Control
A common interface is needed, which allows userland applications to
perform online file access control. Dazuko aims to provide that interface."
FWIW, I'm not associated with Dazuko or Antivir; I've been happily using
Dazuko with AntiVir for a year or so.
1. AntiVir includes numerous Linux signatures as well as Windows. So I
scan both 'ix downloads, as well as the process of compiling new software.
2. Other AntiMalwares are using Dazuko, though many are scanning for
Windows malware only.
3. The AntiVir/Dazuko combination with full heuristics has blocked
access to clearly dangerous JS scripts in my browser cache.
4. IMHO, what is needed is a Dazuko or libmalware/Integrity database
link. If an md5 of an executable or script is new or has changed, access
is blocked 'til a response to a popup is given. Access can be blocked;
one-time allowed; or permanently allowed, in which case the md5 is updated.
Hope This Helps.
<next msg>
Andi Kleen wrote:
> 7v5w7go9ub0o <7v5w7go9ub0o@gmail.com> writes:
>
>> (FYI. Dazuko may have trailblazed some of the issues now under
>> discussion re: libmalware.so. It has worked well for me.
>
> Against what exactly did it protect you? Please give a concrete example.
>
> -Andi
>
1. This came in a few minutes ago:
Aug 13 14:56:31 tux antivir[6381]: AntiVir ALERT: [EML/FakeLink.F]
/jail/tbird/root/.thunderbird/0r2957kg.default/Mail/L
ocal Folders/Junk.XXX <<< Contains detection pattern of EML/FakeLink.F
in EML form
2. I have not retained the logs of "suspicious scripts" in my browser,
but have come across perhaps 4 blocked scripts within the last month.
Admittedly at dodgy sites.
XSS attacks are platform independent, and are a significant concern.
Please note that when I say it has worked well for me, I am not saying
that it has saved my bacon! :-)
1. I am referring to the mechanics of having the Kernel/userland app
stop processing when it finds a malware signature or heuristic detection.
2. Am also referring to the totally manageable (IMHO) overhead.
I've mentioned my experience with Dazuko/antivir only because it may be
useful to the ongoing discussion about the nature of libmalware.so.
3. I am frankly waiting for a bug to get into my upstream distribution
chain - through a hijacking or some wonderful DNS prank - at which point
I ..hope.. a signature or heuristic will block my root-enabled make install.
4. Again, my hope for libmalware.so/dazuko is a realtime
integrity-management link.
<end posts>
HTH
p.s. The question has developed, should this monitor root activities.
IMHO, the answer is a definite YES! We are most vulnerable during
software updating; AntiMailware signatures may stop the compilation or
installation of a Trojan - by root.
--
