On 15 Jul 2008 at 16:28, Linus Torvalds wrote:oh, we're back to that. i told you that already, here it is again (just quoting myself back): when you fix a bug, the commit describes what it fixes without omitting anything relevant. when you fix a security bug, its commit doesn't say what it fixes (not even that it's a security fix, never mind actual impact information), that is, you omit relevant information (based on some ill-conceived argument that i deconstructed at the beginning). in other words, you're *not* treating security bugs as normal bugs. for all intents and purposes, you cover them up. i *wish* you did treat them as normal bugs however. we went through this and you yourself said that security bugs are *not* treated as normal bugs because you do omit relevant information from such commits whereas you do *not* omit relevant information from normal commits. for security bugs the fact that they fix a security issue is relevant information. repeating the same thing doesn't make the self-contradiction above go away. bugs are properly described in the commits, security bugs aren't (you said so yourself), therefore they can't be of the same category. what you're still trying to justify is why you are covering up security bugs, plain and simple. why would people think that unmarked bugfixes are less important? who are you to make that judgement for them anyway? the importance of bugs is *orthogonal* to their classification (security, etc). it's up to the people and their decision making processes to deal with that. all you should do is help them by not withholding relevant information. in case it wasn't clear, i'm not talking about just about any person like my grandma, but people whose work involves following kernel development, who can use all the extra information to make judgement calls about what to prioritize. they're certainly not dumb and would not think that only commits marked as such are security related. you have yet to prove why it's pointless. the above attempt failed to do so. it's not a myth, it's called reality. a bugfix that gets my pc speaker beep again is very different from a fix that stops the tcp/ip stack sending out random kernel memory to the net (just made them up, before anyone starts looking). you're desperately trying to ignore the importance of security bugs but you're failing. the world has decided that security bugs *are* important and deserve special attention. and it's not as if you had to do any extra work, you already have the information, you should just not *withhold* it. 'importance' is not a big grey goo that applies equally to all fixes. you want to make it appear so, but that doesn't make it so. why does it make people think that? did you ask them? what if you told them as i suggested (and you conveniently skipped) what to expect? do you think people dealing with kernel maintenance at companies, distros, etc are that dumb? cheers, PaX Team --
| david | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Bart Van Assche | Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
| Greg KH | [GIT PATCH] driver core patches against 2.6.24 |
| Heiko Carstens | Re: -mm merge plans for 2.6.23 -- sys_fallocate |
git: | |
| David Miller | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| Jarek Poplawski | [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 05/37] dccp: Cleanup routines for feature negotiation |
| Lennert Buytenhek | [PATCH 16/39] mv643xx_eth: get rid of ETH_/ethernet_/eth_ prefixes |
