Adrian Bunk wrote:No in this case /dev/urandom is the wrong choice. You should seed then some standard RND with the time,pid as is the classical way and not use any precious entropy. Yes some programs don't do that, but they're wrong and actually slightly dangerous. Even the cryptographic programs normally use /dev/urandom to get session keys etc. That is because they are definitely concerned about local DoS. Just strace your ssh daemon or your SSL web server to see what I mean. Yes, but if you read the context of that patch it commented out the code that accessed /dev/urandom! Please reread my analysis of the issue. If you have already entropy in the pool the additional feed doesn't change anything. And if you don't it still stays the same. -Andi --
| Ingo Molnar | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Greg Kroah-Hartman | [PATCH 001/196] Chinese: Add the known_regression URI to the HOWTO |
| Roland Dreier | Re: Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
git: | |
| David Miller | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Arjan van de Ven | Re: [GIT]: Networking |
| Linus Torvalds | Re: iptables very slow after commit 784544739a25c30637397ace5489eeb6e15d7d49 |
