Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@...>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...>, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...>, Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...>, Roland McGrath <roland@...>, <linux-kernel@...>, Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...>, Chris Wright <chrisw@...>
On Tue, 2008-03-25 at 02:04 +0300, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
Not an issue for SELinux (we apply an orthogonal check based on security
context, so we can already block ptrace of init independent of whether
root/CAP_SYS_PTRACE can do it). I'm not sure though as to whether
people using capabilities have ever relied on this special protection of
init (e.g. custom init spawns children with lesser capabilities and
relies on the fact that they cannot ptrace init to effectively re-gain
those capabilities, even if they possess CAP_SYS_PTRACE).
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
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