[PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock

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To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...>, Atsushi Tsuji <a-tsuji@...>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@...>, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...>, Davide Libenzi <davidel@...>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...>, Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@...>, <linux-kernel@...>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...>
Date: Tuesday, March 18, 2008 - 10:44 am

(on top of signals-cleanup-security_task_kill-usage-implementation.patch)

This wasn't documented, but as Atsushi Tsuji <a-tsuji@bk.jp.nec.com> pointed
out check_kill_permission() needs tasklist_lock for task_session_nr().
I missed this fact when removed tasklist from the callers.

Change check_kill_permission() to take tasklist_lock for the SIGCONT case.
Re-order security checks so that we take tasklist_lock only if/when it is
actually needed. This is a minimal fix for now, tasklist will be removed
later.

Also change the code to use task_session() instead of task_session_nr().

Also, remove the SIGCONT check from cap_task_kill(), it is bogus (and the
whole function is bogus. Serge, Eric, why it is still alive?).

Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>

--- 25/kernel/signal.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST	2008-03-18 14:47:00.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/kernel/signal.c	2008-03-18 17:25:19.000000000 +0300
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long m
 static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
 				 struct task_struct *t)
 {
+	struct pid *sid;
 	int error;
 
 	if (!valid_signal(sig))
@@ -545,11 +546,24 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	if (((sig != SIGCONT) || (task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t)))
-	    && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
-	    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
-	    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return -EPERM;
+	if ((current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) &&
+	    (current->uid  ^ t->suid) && (current->uid  ^ t->uid) &&
+	    !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
+		switch (sig) {
+		case SIGCONT:
+			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+			sid = task_session(t);
+			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+			/*
+			 * We don't return the error if sid == NULL. The
+			 * task was unhashed, the caller must notice this.
+			 */
+			if (!sid || sid == task_session(current))
+				break;
+		default:
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
+	}
 
 	return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
 }
--- 25/security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST	2008-03-18 17:07:02.000000000 +0300
+++ 25/security/commoncap.c	2008-03-18 17:21:10.000000000 +0300
@@ -552,10 +552,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
 	if (p->uid == current->uid)
 		return 0;
 
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
 	if (secid)
 		/*
 		 * Signal sent as a particular user.

--
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[PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under ..., Oleg Nesterov, (Tue Mar 18, 10:44 am)