> On 2/28/08,
serge@hallyn.com <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> > Quoting BuraphaLinux Server (
buraphalinuxserver@gmail.com):
> > > This is gmail which has broken line wrapping I cannot fix. Anyway, I
> > > did build the new kernel but it still does not work for me. I tried to
> > > strace, but that didn't work for me either. This is as a non-root user
> > > (and same 'at'/'atd' binaries work on 2.6.23.X):
> > >
> > > bash-3.2$ at now
> > > warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
> > > at> echo "suid is busted"
> > > at> <EOT>
> > > job 4 at Thu Feb 28 02:16:00 2008
> > > Can't signal atd (permission denied)
> > > bash-3.2$ ls -ld $(which at)
> > > -rws--x--x 1 daemon daemon 36468 Jan 11 15:37 /usr/bin/at
> > > bash-3.2$ ps -ef | grep atd
> > > daemon 2874 1 0 02:14 ? 00:00:00 /usr/sbin/atd -b 15 -l 1
> > > bozo 3054 3049 0 02:16 pts/0 00:00:00 grep atd
> > > bash-3.2$ ls -ld /var/spool/at*
> > > drwxrwxrwt 2 daemon daemon 4096 Feb 28 02:16 /var/spool/atjobs
> > > drwx------ 2 daemon daemon 4096 Feb 27 20:02 /var/spool/atspool
> > > bash-3.2$ uname -a
> > > Linux zappaman.cs.buu.ac.th 2.6.25-rc3 #1 SMP Thu Feb 28 01:29:46 ICT
> > > 2008 i686 pentium4 i386 GNU/Linux
> > > bash-3.2$ strace -s 99999 -v -o /tmp/pain at now
> > > warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
> > > Cannot open lockfile /var/spool/atjobs/.SEQ: Permission denied
> > > bash-3.2$ at now
> > > warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
> > > at> echo "hi"
> > > at> <EOT>
> > > job 7 at Thu Feb 28 02:19:00 2008
> > > Can't signal atd (permission denied)
> > >
> > > My kenrel .config is big, so it is attached so I don't get any cut and
> > > paste error.
> > >
> > > On 2/28/08,
serge@hallyn.com <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> > > > Quoting BuraphaLinux Server (
buraphalinuxserver@gmail.com):
> > > > >
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=463669
> > > > >
> > > > > I have the same problem - it is not debian specific. Did the
> > > > > semantics of kill() change with the new kernel? I thought as long as
> > > > > something is setuid, even with capability stuff around the setuid
> > > > > programs just get _all_ capabilities and would keep working.
> > > > >
> > > > > I did a good search and found many people with the problem, but no
> > > > > solutions except going back to 2.6.23.x kernels. I guess you'll flame
> > > > > me, but at least include a link to the solution too.
> > > >
> > > > Why would we flame you?
> > >
> > > Because maybe I'm doing something stupid and didn't patch/rebuild
> > > something when changing kernels like I should. I haven't had trouble
> > > with at for many years of kernel changes, but 2.6.24 was the first
> > > with the new security stuff and maybe I need to have some
> > > capability-aware 'at' program?
> > >
> > > > I'll just apologize as I think
> > it's my fault,
> > > > and ask you to please try the newest available kernel where I believe it
> > > > should be fixed.
> > >
> > > Do I need to recompile glibc and the at software to adjust so some
> > > kernel interface changes? Did the 'make oldconfig' generate some bad
> > > config combination? As root it works, so I don't think the at or atd
> > > are broken (but maybe they have to be patched for >2.6.23.X ?)
> > >
> > > bash-3.2$ su - root
> > > Password:
> > > BLS #at now
> > > warning: commands will be executed using /bin/sh
> > > at> echo "uh-huh..."
> > > at> <EOT>
> > > job 8 at Thu Feb 28 02:30:00 2008
> > >
> > > (and I checked and the job completes normally)
> > >
> > > > thanks,
> > > > -serge
> > >
> > > Thank you for reading. Any ideas on what to try next?
> >
> > I'm working on setting up something I can test this on better, but just
> > for good measure can you try the following patch? It should simply
> > prevent the extra signal checks from happening.
> >
> > thanks,
> > -serge
> >
> > From f48d28fe525652cb7321d5f545f9dcdfb3ce97d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> > Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2008 20:53:47 +0000
> > Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: get rid of cap_task_kill
> >
> > This is just a test to not use cap_task_kill. We will see whether
> > this fixes the atd problem
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/security.h | 2 +-
> > security/capability.c | 1 -
> > 2 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > index fe52cde..4c43914 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > @@ -2138,7 +2138,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct
> > task_struct *p,
> > struct siginfo *info, int sig,
> > u32 secid)
> > {
> > - return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
> > + return 0;
> > }
> >
> > static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
> > diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
> > index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
> > --- a/security/capability.c
> > +++ b/security/capability.c
> > @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
> > .inode_need_killpriv = cap_inode_need_killpriv,
> > .inode_killpriv = cap_inode_killpriv,
> >
> > - .task_kill = cap_task_kill,
> > .task_setscheduler = cap_task_setscheduler,
> > .task_setioprio = cap_task_setioprio,
> > .task_setnice = cap_task_setnice,
> > --
> > 1.5.2.5
> >
> >
> >
