From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Tue, 26 Feb 2008 16:49:00 -0800 (PST)
[ Thomas, forgot to CC: you earlier, changeset
a0c1e9073ef7428a14309cba010633a6cd6719ea ("futex: runtime enable pi
and robust functionality") broke sparc64. ]
The following patch will let things "work" but the trick being used
here by the FUTEX layer is borderline valid in my opinion.
Basically for 10+ years on sparc64 we've had this check here in the
fault path, which makes sure that if we're processing an exception
table entry we really, truly, are doing an access to userspace from
the kernel. Otherwise we OOPS.
What the FUTEX checking code is doing now is doing a "user" access
with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) since it runs from the kernel bootup early init
sequence. And this is illegal according to the existing checks.
When we do set_fs(KERNEL_DS) then pass a "user" pointer down
into a system call or something like that, we give it a pointer
that "cannot fault". So if we get into the fault handling
path here for a case like that we really do want to scream and
print out an OOPS message in my opinion.
I realize that not many platforms other than sparc64 can check
for things this precisely, but it's something to consider.
Did this FUTEX change go into -stable too?
diff --git a/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c b/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
index e2027f2..9183633 100644
--- a/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/sparc64/mm/fault.c
@@ -244,16 +244,8 @@ static void do_kernel_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, int si_code, int fault_code,
if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) {
const struct exception_table_entry *entry;
- if (asi == ASI_P && (insn & 0xc0800000) == 0xc0800000) {
- if (insn & 0x2000)
- asi = (regs->tstate >> 24);
- else
- asi = (insn >> 5);
- }
-
- /* Look in asi.h: All _S asis have LS bit set */
- if ((asi & 0x1) &&
- (entry = search_exception_tables(regs->tpc))) {
+ entry = search_exception_tables(regs->tpc);
+ if (entry) {
regs->tpc = entry->fixup;
regs->tnpc = regs->tpc + 4;
return;
--
