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Re: [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct
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From: Casey Schaufler
Subject:
Re: [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct
Date: Thursday, February 21, 2008 - 9:47 pm
--- David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
quoted text
> Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the > security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers > pointing to it.
quoted text
> ...
quoted text
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c > index f6b5f6e..722752f 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c > @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode) > { > int rc; > > - rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode); > + rc = smk_access(current->act_as->security, obj_label, mode); > if (rc == 0) > return 0; > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 25cbfa3..a49d94f 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct > task_struct *ctp) > if (rc != 0) > return rc; > > - rc = smk_access(ptp->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE); > + rc = smk_access(ptp->act_as->security, ctp->sec->security, > + MAY_READWRITE); > if (rc != 0 && __capable(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > return 0; > > @@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct > task_struct *ctp) > static int smack_syslog(int type) > { > int rc; > - char *sp = current->security; > + char *sp = current->act_as->security; > > rc = cap_syslog(type); > if (rc != 0) > @@ -359,7 +360,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int > flags) > */ > static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) > { > - inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security); > + inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->act_as->security); > if (inode->i_security == NULL) > return -ENOMEM; > return 0; > @@ -777,7 +778,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int > mask) > */ > static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) > { > - file->f_security = current->security; > + file->f_security = current->act_as->security; > return 0; > } > > @@ -875,7 +876,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned > int cmd, > */ > static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) > { > - file->f_security = current->security; > + file->f_security = current->act_as->security; > return 0; > } > > @@ -900,7 +901,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct > *tsk, > * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file > */ > file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); > - rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > if (rc != 0 && __capable(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > return 0; > return rc; > @@ -943,7 +944,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) > */ > static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk) > { > - tsk->security = current->security; > + tsk->sec->security = current->act_as->security; > > return 0; > } > @@ -958,7 +959,7 @@ static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct > *tsk) > */ > static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task) > { > - task->security = NULL; > + task->sec->security = NULL; > } > > /** > @@ -970,7 +971,7 @@ static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct > *task) > */ > static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -981,7 +982,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, > pid_t pgid) > */ > static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -992,7 +993,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) > */ > static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1004,7 +1005,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) > */ > static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) > { > - *secid = smack_to_secid(p->security); > + *secid = smack_to_secid(p->sec->security); > } > > /** > @@ -1016,7 +1017,7 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, > u32 *secid) > */ > static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1028,7 +1029,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, > int nice) > */ > static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1039,7 +1040,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, > int ioprio) > */ > static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1053,7 +1054,7 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) > static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, > struct sched_param *lp) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1064,7 +1065,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct > *p, int policy, > */ > static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ); > } > > /** > @@ -1075,7 +1076,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct > *p) > */ > static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) > { > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc(p->act_as->security, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1107,13 +1108,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, > struct siginfo *info, > * can write the receiver. > */ > if (secid == 0) > - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > /* > * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO > * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing > * we can't take privilege into account. > */ > - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > } > > /** > @@ -1126,7 +1127,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > { > int rc; > > - rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE); > + rc = smk_access(current->act_as->security, p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE); > if (rc == 0) > return 0; > > @@ -1157,7 +1158,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) > { > struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; > - isp->smk_inode = p->security; > + isp->smk_inode = p->act_as->security; > } > > /* > @@ -1176,7 +1177,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, > struct inode *inode) > */ > static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t > gfp_flags) > { > - char *csp = current->security; > + char *csp = current->act_as->security; > struct socket_smack *ssp; > > ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags); > @@ -1401,7 +1402,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) > */ > static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) > { > - msg->security = current->security; > + msg->security = current->act_as->security; > return 0; > } > > @@ -1437,7 +1438,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel > *shp) > { > struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm; > > - isp->security = current->security; > + isp->security = current->act_as->security; > return 0; > } > > @@ -1545,7 +1546,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array > *sma) > { > struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm; > > - isp->security = current->security; > + isp->security = current->act_as->security; > return 0; > } > > @@ -1648,7 +1649,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct > msg_queue *msq) > { > struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm; > > - kisp->security = current->security; > + kisp->security = current->act_as->security; > return 0; > } > > @@ -1790,7 +1791,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry > *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) > struct super_block *sbp; > struct superblock_smack *sbsp; > struct inode_smack *isp; > - char *csp = current->security; > + char *csp = current->act_as->security; > char *fetched; > char *final; > struct dentry *dp; > @@ -1935,7 +1936,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, > char *name, char **value) > if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0) > return -EINVAL; > > - cp = kstrdup(p->security, GFP_KERNEL); > + cp = kstrdup(p->sec->security, GFP_KERNEL); > if (cp == NULL) > return -ENOMEM; > > @@ -1981,7 +1982,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, > char *name, > if (newsmack == NULL) > return -EINVAL; > > - p->security = newsmack; > + p->sec->security = newsmack; > return size; > } > > @@ -2211,8 +2212,8 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct > socket *parent) > return; > > ssp = sk->sk_security; > - ssp->smk_in = current->security; > - ssp->smk_out = current->security; > + ssp->smk_in = current->act_as->security; > + ssp->smk_out = current->act_as->security; > ssp->smk_packet[0] = '__PLACEHOLDER__2_'; > > rc = smack_netlabel(sk); > @@ -2285,7 +2286,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, > struct sk_buff *skb, > static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk, > unsigned long flags) > { > - key->security = tsk->security; > + key->security = tsk->act_as->security; > return 0; > } > > @@ -2326,10 +2327,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, > /* > * This should not occur > */ > - if (context->security == NULL) > + if (context->act_as->security == NULL) > return -EACCES; > > - return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE); > + return smk_access(context->act_as->security, keyp->security, > + MAY_READWRITE); > } > #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ > > @@ -2510,7 +2512,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) > /* > * Set the security state for the initial task. > */ > - current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known; > + current->sec->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known; > > /* > * Initialize locks > diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c > index 358c92c..2cb3a5e 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c > +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c > @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ void smk_cipso_doi(void) > struct netlbl_audit audit_info; > > audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); > - audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security); > + audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->sec->security); > > rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info); > if (rc != 0) > @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient) > struct netlbl_audit audit_info; > > audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); > - audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security); > + audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->sec->security); > > if (oldambient != NULL) { > rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
The Smack portions look fine. Thank you. Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com
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Messages in current thread:
[PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:05 am)
[PATCH 01/37] KEYS: Increase the payload size when instant ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 02/37] KEYS: Check starting keyring as part of search
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 03/37] KEYS: Allow the callout data to be passed as ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 04/37] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 05/37] Security: Change current->fs[ug]id to curren ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context fro ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 07/37] Security: De-embed task security record from ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 08/37] Security: Add a kernel_service object class ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 10/37] Security: Make NFSD work with detached security
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 11/37] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:06 am)
[PATCH 12/37] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 13/37] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() f ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 14/37] FS-Cache: Generic filesystem caching facility
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 15/37] CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 16/37] CacheFiles: Be consistent about the use of m ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 17/37] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single pag ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 18/37] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 19/37] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 20/37] CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounte ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 21/37] NFS: Add comment banners to some NFS functions
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 22/37] NFS: Add FS-Cache option bit and debug bit
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:07 am)
[PATCH 23/37] NFS: Permit local filesystem caching to be e ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 24/37] NFS: Register NFS for caching and retrieve t ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 25/37] NFS: Define and create server-level objects
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 26/37] NFS: Define and create superblock-level objects
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 27/37] NFS: Define and create inode-level cache objects
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 28/37] NFS: Use local disk inode cache
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 29/37] NFS: Invalidate FsCache page flags when cach ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 30/37] NFS: Add some new I/O event counters for FS- ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 31/37] NFS: FS-Cache page management
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 32/37] NFS: Add read context retention for FS-Cache ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 33/37] NFS: nfs_readpage_async() needs to be access ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:08 am)
[PATCH 34/37] NFS: Read pages from FS-Cache into an NFS inode
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:09 am)
[PATCH 35/37] NFS: Store pages from an NFS inode into a lo ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:09 am)
[PATCH 36/37] NFS: Display local caching state
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:09 am)
[PATCH 37/37] NFS: Add mount options to enable local cachi ...
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 9:09 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Serge E. Hallyn
, (Wed Feb 20, 12:58 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Wed Feb 20, 1:11 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Daniel Phillips
, (Wed Feb 20, 8:07 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Thu Feb 21, 5:31 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Thu Feb 21, 7:55 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Kevin Coffman
, (Thu Feb 21, 8:17 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Daniel Phillips
, (Thu Feb 21, 3:44 pm)
RE: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Muntz, Daniel
, (Thu Feb 21, 3:52 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Thu Feb 21, 4:33 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Thu Feb 21, 5:07 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Daniel Phillips
, (Thu Feb 21, 5:57 pm)
Re: [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context ...
, Casey Schaufler
, (Thu Feb 21, 9:47 pm)
Re: [PATCH 07/37] Security: De-embed task security record ...
, Casey Schaufler
, (Thu Feb 21, 9:57 pm)
Re: [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to overr ...
, Casey Schaufler
, (Thu Feb 21, 10:06 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Fri Feb 22, 5:48 am)
Re: [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to overr ...
, David Howells
, (Fri Feb 22, 6:06 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Chris Mason
, (Fri Feb 22, 6:52 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Fri Feb 22, 9:12 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Fri Feb 22, 9:14 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Fri Feb 22, 9:47 am)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, Daniel Phillips
, (Fri Feb 22, 3:25 pm)
Re: [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching
, David Howells
, (Fri Feb 22, 6:22 pm)
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