Hi, As the subject says the 2.6.24.1 is still vulnerable to the vmsplice local root exploit. [opa@test tmp]$ uname -a Linux tester 2.6.24.1 #1 Sun Feb 10 00:06:49 EST 2008 i686 unknown [opa@test tmp]$ ./vms ----------------------------------- Linux vmsplice Local Root Exploit By qaaz ----------------------------------- [+] mmap: 0x0 .. 0x1000 [+] page: 0x0 [+] page: 0x20 [+] mmap: 0x4000 .. 0x5000 [+] page: 0x4000 [+] page: 0x4020 [+] mmap: 0x1000 .. 0x2000 [+] page: 0x1000 [+] mmap: 0xb7f56000 .. 0xb7f88000 [+] root [root@test tmp]# [root@test tmp]# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=2033(opa) [root@test tmp]# uname -a Linux test 2.6.24.1 #1 Sun Feb 10 00:06:49 EST 2008 i686 unknown Is there any known fix/patch for this? --
Yes indeed, that's quite bad. 2.6.24-git is still vulnerable too, and also contains the fix :-( CC'd Jens as he worked on the fix. Willy --
I was unable to gain root on 2.6.24-git20 but after several segfaults when executing the exploit continously the machine crashes. --Niki --
this fixed the problem for me (kernel 2.6.24.1) :
It appears that the initial patch checked the input to vmsplice_to_user,
but the exploit used vmsplice_to_pipe which remained open to the attack.
--- fs/splice.c.orig 2008-02-08 21:55:30.000000000 +0200
+++ fs/splice.c 2008-02-10 11:32:50.000000000 +0200
@@ -1443,6 +1443,10 @@
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
struct page *pages[PIPE_BUFFERS];
struct partial_page partial[PIPE_BUFFERS];
+ int error;
+ long ret;
+ void __user *base;
+ size_t len;
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages,
.partial = partial,
@@ -1450,6 +1454,31 @@
.ops = &user_page_pipe_buf_ops,
};
+ error = ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Get user address base and length for this iovec.
+ */
+ error = get_user(base, &iov->iov_base);
+ if (unlikely(error))
+ return error;
+ error = get_user(len, &iov->iov_len);
+ if (unlikely(error))
+ return error;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check this iovec. 0 read succeeds.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!len))
+ return 0;
+ if (unlikely(!base)) {
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, base, len))) {
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
pipe = pipe_info(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
if (!pipe)
return -EBADF;
--
hmmm, with 2.6.22.y serie is too affected Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by applicable law. Last login: Sat Feb 9 15:34:35 2008 oliver@home:~$ ./2617_26241_root_exploit ----------------------------------- Linux vmsplice Local Root Exploit By qaaz ----------------------------------- [+] mmap: 0x0 .. 0x1000 [+] page: 0x0 [+] page: 0x20 [+] mmap: 0x4000 .. 0x5000 [+] page: 0x4000 [+] page: 0x4020 [+] mmap: 0x1000 .. 0x2000 [+] page: 0x1000 [+] mmap: 0xb7f79000 .. 0xb7fab000 [+] root root@home:~# uname -a Linux home 2.6.22.17 #3 SMP PREEMPT Mon Feb 4 17:38:33 CET 2008 i686 GNU/Linux root@home:~# -- Thanks, Oliver --
Use VERIFY_READ and this only checks the first entry.
I checked the following patch and it at least fixes the known exploit.
diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c
index 14e2262..80beb2b 100644
--- a/fs/splice.c
+++ b/fs/splice.c
@@ -1237,6 +1237,11 @@ static int get_iovec_page_array(const struct iovec __user *iov,
if (unlikely(!base))
break;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, base, len)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+
/*
* Get this base offset and number of pages, then map
* in the user pages.
--
Even historians fail to learn from history -- they repeat the same mistakes.
-- John Gill, "Patterns of Force", stardate 2534.7
--
This patch is against 2.6.24.1 which has already the fix to vmsplice_to_user With it i can't exploit the hole, and it is returns "invalid address" --
This is the vmsplice_to_pipe path and I have many reports that it is not fixed. Bastian -- If there are self-made purgatories, then we all have to live in them. -- Spock, "This Side of Paradise", stardate 3417.7 --
Exactly, my patch is for the the vmsplice_to_pipe path. I don't guarantee correctness, but it stops the exploit in my environment. Niki --
commit f6e993b835393543bab2d917f9dea75218473edd
Author: Oliver Pinter <oliver.pntr@gmail.com>
Date: Sun Feb 10 14:03:46 2008 +0100
[PATCH] vm: splice local root exploit fix for 2.6.22.y
Based on Bastian Blank's patch
Fix for CVE_2008_0009 and CVE_2008-0010
----->8-----
oliver@pancs:/tmp$ ./2617_26241_root_exploit
-----------------------------------
Linux vmsplice Local Root Exploit
By qaaz
-----------------------------------
[+] mmap: 0x0 .. 0x1000
[+] page: 0x0
[+] page: 0x20
[+] mmap: 0x4000 .. 0x5000
[+] page: 0x4000
[+] page: 0x4020
[+] mmap: 0x1000 .. 0x2000
[+] page: 0x1000
[+] mmap: 0xb7f1a000 .. 0xb7f4c000
[-] vmsplice: Bad address
-----8<-----
Signed-off-by: Oliver Pinter <oliver.pntr@gmail.com>
diff --git a/fs/splice.c b/fs/splice.c
index e263d3b..d8b106e 100644
--- a/fs/splice.c
+++ b/fs/splice.c
@@ -1182,6 +1182,12 @@ static int get_iovec_page_array(const struct
iovec __user *iov,
if (unlikely(!base))
break;
+ /* CVE-2008-0009, CVE-2008-0010 fix */
+ if(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, base, len)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+
/*
* Get this base offset and number of pages, then map
* in the user pages.
<<<<<<<
oliver@pancs:/tmp$ ./2617_26241_root_exploit
-----------------------------------
Linux vmsplice Local Root Exploit
By qaaz
-----------------------------------
[+] mmap: 0x0 .. 0x1000
[+] page: 0x0
[+] page: 0x20
[+] mmap: 0x4000 .. 0x5000
[+] page: 0x4000
[+] page: 0x4020
[+] mmap: 0x1000 .. 0x2000
[+] page: 0x1000
[+] mmap: 0xb7f1a000 .. 0xb7f4c000
[-] vmsplice: Bad addres
--
Thanks,
Oliver
--
No, this is a different CVE, as it is a different problem from the original 09 and 10 report. It has been given CVE-2008-0600 to address this issue (09 and 10 only Hm, perhaps we should just properly check the len field instead? That's what is being overflowed here... thanks, greg k-h --
Sorry, I forgot to cc you on this one: http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/10/153 I don't see where the current code is checking that base is accessible. We just check that we can copy the struct iovecs, right? Pekka --
simple len and base check is already in kernel:
2.6.22.17 @ 1176,2-16 - fs/splice.c
/*
* Sanity check this iovec. 0 read succeeds.
*/
if (unlikely(!len))
break;
error = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!base))
break;
--
Thanks,
Oliver
--
As far as i can see, at least on x86 and x86_64 the first argument to access_ok : (VERIFY_READ|VERIFY_WRITE) is ignored. Also even if it is used on different arch, using WRITE instead of READ should be safe because WRITE is a superset of READ. You are right that it only catches the first entry. --Niki --
