While discussing[1] the need for glibc to have access to random bytes during program load, it seems that an earlier attempt to implement AT_RANDOM got stalled. This implements a configurable number of random bytes available to every ELF program via a new auxv AT_RANDOM vector. [1] http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2008-10/msg00006.html Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> --- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/auxvec.h | 4 +++- security/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 655ed8d..9b2ea62 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec, elf_addr_t __user *sp; elf_addr_t __user *u_platform; elf_addr_t __user *u_base_platform; + elf_addr_t __user *u_rand_bytes; + unsigned int rand_size; const char *k_platform = ELF_PLATFORM; const char *k_base_platform = ELF_BASE_PLATFORM; int items; @@ -196,6 +198,18 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec, return -EFAULT; } + rand_size = CONFIG_SECURITY_AUXV_RANDOM_SIZE * sizeof(unsigned long); + u_rand_bytes = NULL; + if (rand_size) { + unsigned char k_rand_bytes[CONFIG_SECURITY_AUXV_RANDOM_SIZE * + sizeof(unsigned long)]; + get_random_bytes(k_rand_bytes, rand_size); + + u_rand_bytes = (elf_addr_t __user *)STACK_ALLOC(p, rand_size); + if (__copy_to_user(u_rand_bytes, k_rand_bytes, rand_size)) + return -EFAULT; + } + /* Create the ELF interpreter info */ elf_info = (elf_addr_t *)current->mm->saved_auxv; /* update AT_VECTOR_SIZE_BASE if the number of NEW_AUX_ENT() changes */ @@ -228,6 +242,12 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct elfhdr *exec, NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_GID, tsk->gid); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EGID, tsk->egid); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_SECURE, security_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); + if (rand_size) { + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_RANDOM_SIZE, + (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)rand_size); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_RANDOM, + (elf_addr_t)(unsigned long)u_rand_bytes); + } NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EXECFN, bprm->exec); if (k_platform) { NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PLATFORM, diff --git a/include/linux/auxvec.h b/include/linux/auxvec.h index d7afa9d..df4ff65 100644 --- a/include/linux/auxvec.h +++ b/include/linux/auxvec.h @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ #define AT_PLATFORM 15 /* string identifying CPU for optimizations */ #define AT_HWCAP 16 /* arch dependent hints at CPU capabilities */ #define AT_CLKTCK 17 /* frequency at which times() increments */ +#define AT_RANDOM 18 /* address of random bytes */ +#define AT_RANDOM_SIZE 19 /* number of random bytes at AT_RANDOM */ #define AT_SECURE 23 /* secure mode boolean */ @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ #define AT_EXECFN 31 /* filename of program */ #ifdef __KERNEL__ -#define AT_VECTOR_SIZE_BASE 18 /* NEW_AUX_ENT entries in auxiliary table */ +#define AT_VECTOR_SIZE_BASE 20 /* NEW_AUX_ENT entries in auxiliary table */ /* number of "#define AT_.*" above, minus {AT_NULL, AT_IGNORE, AT_NOTELF} */ #endif diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index f6c0429..8d9d49d 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -114,6 +114,15 @@ config SECURITY_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR This value can be changed after boot using the /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable. +config SECURITY_AUXV_RANDOM_SIZE + int "Number of random longs to store in AT_RANDOM on every exec" + default 4 + help + This value determines the size of the random longs provided + to programs via the auxv AT_RANDOM vector. It can be used + to initialize random values needed during program load. + + If you are unsure how many longs to use, answer 4. source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig -- 1.5.6.3 -- Kees Cook Ubuntu Security Team --
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