Quoting Jan Kara (jack@suse.cz):
quoted text
> On Tue 04-09-07 16:32:10, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting Jan Kara (jack@suse.cz):
> > > On Thu 30-08-07 17:14:47, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Quoting Jan Kara (jack@suse.cz):
> > > > >   I imagine it so that you have a machine and on it several virtual
> > > > > machines which are sharing a filesystem (or it could be a cluster). Now you
> > > > > want UIDs to be independent between these virtual machines. That's it,
> > > > > right?
> > > > >   Now to continue the example: Alice has UID 100 on machineA, Bob has
> > > > >  UID 100 on machineB. These translate to UIDs 1000 and 1001 on the common
> > > > > filesystem. Process of Alice writes to a file and Bob becomes to be over
> > > > > quota. In this situation, there would be probably two processes (from
> > > > > machineA and machineB) listening on the netlink socket. We want to send a
> > > > > message so that on Alice's desktop we can show a message: "You caused
> > > > > Bob to exceed his quotas" and of Bob's desktop: "Alice has caused that you
> > > > > are over quota.".
> > > > 
> > > > Since this is over NFS, you handle it the way you would any other time
> > > > that user Alice on some other machine managed to do this.
> > >   I meant this would actually happen over a local filesystem (imagine
> > > something like "hostfs" from UML).
> > 
> > Ok, then that is where I was previously suggesting that we use an api to
> > report a uid meaningful in bob's context, where we currently (in the
> > absense of meaningful mount uids and uid equivalence) tell Bob that root
> > was the one who brought him over quota.  From a user pov 'nobody' would
> > make more sense, but I don't think we want the kernel to know about user
> > nobody, right?
>   But what is the problem with using the filesystem ids? All virtual
> machines in my example should have a notion of those...

I don't know what you mean by filesystem ids.  Do you mean the uid
stored on the fs?  I imagine a network fs could get fancy and store
something more detailed than the unix uid, based on the user's keys.

Do you mean the inode->i_uid?  Nothing wrong with that.  Then we just
assume that either you are in the superblock or mount's user namespace
(depending on how we implement it, probably superblock), or can figure
out what that is.

quoted text
> > So if the msg weren't broadcast, or netlink sockets were tied to one
> > user namespace, we could call a
> > 	int uid_in_user_ns(struct user *, struct user_ns *)
> > sending in Alice's user struct and Bob's userns, and use the result in
> > the netlink message.  Otherwise I'm not sure what is the right answer.
> > We just might need the equivalent of 'struct pid' to struct user, or
> > persistant global user namespace ids (persistant after user namespace
> > destruction, not across reboot) so we can safely send the user_ns * in a
> > netlink msg.
>   Yes, that could also be a solution.
> 
> > > > >   Because there may be is not a notion of Bob on machineA or of Alice on
> > > > > machineB, we are in trouble, right? What I like the most is to use the
> > > > > filesystem identities (as you suggested in some other email). I. e. because
> > > > > both Alice and Bob share a filesystem, identities of both have to make sense
> > > > > to it (for example for purposes of permission checking). So we can probably
> > > > 
> > > > Right, so long as we're talking about local filesystems that's the way
> > > > to go.  If a file write was allowed which brought bob over quota,
> > > > clearly the person responsible had some uid valid on the filesystem to
> > > > allow him to do so.
> > >   Fine. So I'll keep UID in the quota netlink protocol with the meaning
> > > "the identity of the user for filesystem operations".
> > 
> > I think that's ok.
> > 
> > Hopefully when that changes to accomodate user namespaces, we can use
> > netlink field versioning to make that transition pretty seamless?
>   Yes, we'd just assign the attribute a different number and teach
> userspace about the new attribute format...

Ok.

quoted text
> > If not, then we probably should in fact make some decision now so as not
> > to change the api.
> > 
> > > > > send via netlink these (in our example ids 1000 and 1001) and hope that
> > > > > inside machineA and machineB there will be a way to translate these
> > > > > identities to names "Alice" and "Bob". So that user can understand what
> > > > > is happenning. Does this sound plausible?
> > > > >   If we go this route, then we only need a kernel function, that will
> > > > > for a pair ($filesystem, $task) return indentity of that $task used
> > > > > for operations on $filesystem...
> > > > 
> > > > Ok, now I see.  This is again unrelated to user namespaces, it's an
> > > > issue regardless.
> > > > 
> > > > Is there no way to just report Alice as the guilty party to Bob on his
> > > > machine as (host=nfsserver,uid=1000)?
> > >   You know, in fact this contains all the information but it is quite useless
> > > for an ordinary user. The message should be understandable to average desktop
> > 
> > What is the ordinary user going to do about it?  If the user didn't set
> > up the nfsserver and/or the second client, the only thing he can do is
> > report the guilty user to an admin.  In which case the tuple
> > (host=nfsserver,uid=1000) is exactly the data he needs to report.
>   Maybe write him an email or go and bang him with a baseball bat ;)
> Seriously, if someone (like admin) is able to find a physical identity of the
> guilty user, then we should be able to do this in a software too, shouldn't
> we?

Sure, and in many ways.  But if working with NFS, as far as I know the
most common way to solve it is to enforce a common /etc/passwd across
all the valid NFS clients  :)

-serge
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