Cc: <casey@...>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...>, <torvalds@...>, <linux-security-module@...>, <linux-kernel@...>, James Morris <jmorris@...>, Paul Moore <paul.moore@...>
This I agree with
but this is so silly that I have to object.
saying that any security short of perfect security is worthless and we
shouldn't bother is wrong, and needs to be countered every time it's
said.
as ted pointed out in response to your other comments, it very much
depends on where the trust boundry is. so from the point of view of
absolute security you are wrong.
but even more then that, the vast majority of the time absolute security
isn't what matters, relative security is what matters (the model of "I
don't have to outrun the bear, I only have to outrun you") and in these
envrionments things that are less then absolute can still be very useful.
how useful they are depends on a lot of details, and in the case of the
network security being discussed it sure sounds like it's pretty close to
useless if you can't trust the network and the other machines on it, but
that is seperate from the mentality that "anything less then perfect
security is worthless and shouldn't be bothered with" which is what I'm
objecting to.
David Lang
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