Hello. Paul Moore wrote:When I proposed a patch in July, I was patching at post-copy_to_user() step (i.e. after sock_recvmsg()). This approach messed up user-supplied buffer. This time, I'm patching at pre-copy_to_user() step (i.e. at skb_recv_datagram()). This approach doesn't mess up user-supplied buffer. I think this is a cleaner way than the previous patch. Although read() gets an error when select() said "read ready", I can't find other place to use for accomplishing my goals. By the way, similar thing can happen when select() against a file descriptor said "read ready" but read() gets an error if security policy or security-id of the file has changed between select() and read(), isn't it? And such behavior is acceptable, isn't it? If such behavior can happen and is acceptable and *preferable*, I think checking permission at dequeue time (i.e. skb_recv_datagram()) is *preferable* way than checking permission at enqueue time (i.e. socket_sock_rcv_skb()). Regards. -
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| Vu Pham | Re: [Scst-devel] Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
| Adrian Bunk | Re: Linux 2.6.21 |
git: | |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 15/37] dccp: Set per-connection CCIDs via socket options |
| Jarek Poplawski | [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| Radu Rendec | Endianness problem with u32 classifier hash masks |
| Benjamin Herrenschmidt | [PATCH 0/11] ibm_newemac: Candidate patches for 2.6.25 |
