On Thu, Sep 27, 2007 at 02:01:37AM +0200, Adrian Bunk wrote:
chroot() is present in v7, thank you very much. /usr/sys/sys/sys4.c has
chdir()
{
chdirec(&u.u_cdir);
}
chroot()
{
if (suser())
chdirec(&u.u_rdir);
}
and back then it didn't stop lookups by .. at all - u_rdir is only used
in the beginning of namei() (when pathname starts with /), plus the obvious
refcounting in exit()/newproc(). So give me a break - back when it had
been introduced, it didn't do anything jail-like _at_ _all_.
That check appears only in BSD:
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* vfs_lookup.c 4.4 03/06/81 */
+/* vfs_lookup.c 4.5 81/03/09 */
#include "../h/param.h"
#include "../h/systm.h"
@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@
u.u_segflg = 1;
eo = 0;
bp = NULL;
+ if (dp == u.u_rdir && u.u_dent.d_name[0] == '.' &&
+ u.u_dent.d_name[1] == '.' && u.u_dent.d_name[2] == 0)
+ goto cloop;
eloop:
with spectaculary lousy commit message ("lint and a minor fixed") by
wnj. Feel free to ask Bill Joy WTF he had intended. At a guess,
more consistent behaviour in chrooted environment (i.e. pathname
resolution looking as if the subtree had been everything).
To talk about root-safety of _anything_ at that point is bloody ridiculous.
-