> Quoting James Morris (
jmorris@namei.org):
> > On Mon, 25 Jun 2007, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> >
> > > It's useful for some LSMs to be modular, and LSMs which are y/n options won't
> > > have any security architecture issues with unloading at all.
> >
> > Which LSMs? Upstream, there are SELinux and capabilty, and they're not
> > safe as loadable modules.
> >
> > > The mere fact
> > > that SELinux cannot be built as a module is a rather weak argument for
> > > disabling LSM modules as a whole, so please don't.
> >
> > That's not the argument. Please review the thread.
>
> The argument is 'abuse', right?
>
> Abuse is defined as using the LSM hooks for non-security applications,
> right?
>
> It seems to me that the community is doing a good job of discouraging
> such abuse - by redirecting the "wrong-doers" to implement proper
> upstream solutions, i.e. taskstats, the audit subsystem, etc.
>
> Such encouragement seems a far better response than taking away freedoms
> and flexibility from everyone.
