--- David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
quoted text > Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> > What sort of authorization are you thinking of? I would expect
> > that to have been done by cachefileselinuxcontext (or
> > cachefilesspiffylsmcontext) up in userspace. If you're going to
> > rely on userspace applications for policy enforcement they need
> > to be good enough to count on after all.
>
> It can't be done in userspace, otherwise someone using the cachefilesd
> interface can pass an arbitrary context up.
Yes, but I would expect that interface to be protected (owned by root,
mode 0400). If /dev/cachefiles has to be publicly accessable make it
a privileged ioctl.
quoted text > The security context has to be
> passed across the file descriptor attached to /dev/cachefiles along with the
> other configuration parameters as a text string.
I got that.
quoted text > This fd selects the
> particular cache context that a particular instance of a running daemon is
> using.
Yes, but forgive me being slow, I don't see the problem.
Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com
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Messages in current thread:
Re: [PATCH 08/28] SECURITY: Allow kernel services to overrid... , Casey Schaufler , (Wed Dec 12, 3:44 pm)