Phillip Susi wrote:No, unfortunately. The problem is that while in most typical cases may be true, the estimate of how much entropy we have has to be based on the assumption that everything we've done up to that point has been carefully orchestrated by the mortal enemy of whatever is currently asking us for entropy. While I don't have any easy solutions with obvious irrefutable technical brilliance or that will make everyone happy, I do think that one of the problems is that neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are guaranteed to provide what most people want. In the most common use case, you want crypographically-strong randomness even under the assumption that all previous activity is orchestrated by the enemy. Unfortunately, /dev/urandom will happily give you randomness worse than this while /dev/random will block even when you have it. DS --
| Ingo Molnar | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| Greg Kroah-Hartman | [PATCH 001/196] Chinese: Add the known_regression URI to the HOWTO |
| Roland Dreier | Re: Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
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| David Miller | Re: [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
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| Linus Torvalds | Re: iptables very slow after commit 784544739a25c30637397ace5489eeb6e15d7d49 |
