RE: Why does reading from /dev/urandom deplete entropy so much?

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To: Theodore Tso <tytso@...>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...>, Marc Haber <mh+linux-kernel@...>, Eric Dumazet <dada1@...>, Alan Cox <alan@...>, Adrian Bunk <bunk@...>, <linux-kernel@...>
Date: Wednesday, December 12, 2007 - 1:34 am

Phillip Susi wrote:


No, unfortunately. The problem is that while in most typical cases may be
true, the estimate of how much entropy we have has to be based on the
assumption that everything we've done up to that point has been carefully
orchestrated by the mortal enemy of whatever is currently asking us for
entropy.

While I don't have any easy solutions with obvious irrefutable technical
brilliance or that will make everyone happy, I do think that one of the
problems is that neither /dev/random nor /dev/urandom are guaranteed to
provide what most people want. In the most common use case, you want
crypographically-strong randomness even under the assumption that all
previous activity is orchestrated by the enemy. Unfortunately, /dev/urandom
will happily give you randomness worse than this while /dev/random will
block even when you have it.

DS


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RE: Why does reading from /dev/urandom deplete entropy so mu..., David Schwartz, (Wed Dec 12, 1:34 am)