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Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface

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To: Cliffe <cliffe@...>, Peter Dolding <oiaohm@...>
Cc: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...>, Simon Arlott <simon@...>, <linux-kernel@...>, <linux-security-module@...>
Date: Tuesday, November 6, 2007 - 11:35 pm

--- Cliffe <cliffe@ii.net> wrote:


Now that's a refreshing comment. Thank you.


There are people (I'm not one of them) who figure that you
can solve all the security problems by applying sufficiently
fine granularity of on/off permissions.


While you're at it, how about a capability for each possible
directory entry name?


Of course they don't. The only problem they are intended
to solve, and I really mean this, is the association of uid 0
with privilege. That's it. You would be better off with a single
CAP_GODLIKE than with uid 0 having all privilege all the time.
Fine grained capabilities are a bonus, and there are lots of
people who think that it would be really nifty if there were a
separate capability for each "if" in the kernel. I personally
don't see need for more than about 20. That is a matter of taste.
DG/UX ended up with 330 and I say that's too many.



Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com
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Messages in current thread:
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Nov 6, 11:35 pm)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Wed Nov 7, 12:34 am)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Oct 30, 11:01 am)
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