Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface

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To: Crispin Cowan <crispin@...>
Cc: Simon Arlott <simon@...>, <linux-kernel@...>, <linux-security-module@...>
Date: Tuesday, November 6, 2007 - 3:26 am

Crispin Cowan wrote:
...

Security can (and should) be implemented in a layered approach. Not 
allowing stacking means that, rather than creating modules which 
complement each other, certain layers need to be migrated into the 
mainline kernel code. This would be ok if every situation had the same 
security requirements; however, they do not.

For example small LSMs that provide hooks for Malware scanners (like 
dazuko), certain security improvements (such as RaceGuard, PaX ...) and 
POSIX capabilities could be stacked with other larger lsms (traditional 
access control, IDS, firewalls) rather than copying these techniques 
into all the large lsms (such as SELinux and AppArmor) or putting them 
into the mainline kernel. Obviously it would be easier to maintain one 
capability lsm which stacks, than capabilities being implemented in 
every access control lsm.

It may be possible to compile stacked LSMs together (I don't know), but 
modules provide greater flexibility and either way stacking should be 
pursued.

I agree with Crispin, restore modules. Then discussions of suitable ways 
of providing stacking can occur / continue.

Cliffe wrote:

Just to clarify, I was agreeing with Al that layers for the sake of 
layers does not improve security if the layers are flawed. I was not 
implying that the specific LSMs that are being proposed currently 
(AppArmor etc) are flawed. I personally think that AppArmor provides 
security improvements which are particularly suitable in some situations.

However, if you do have defense in depth then a flaw in one layer may be 
compensated by another layer. For example if you have a system wide 
firewall that does not allow any incoming traffic to enter a system, and 
an AppArmor profile denies all network traffic to a specific 
application, then a flaw in the firewall which would ordinarily result 
in a compromise of the systems policy would not cause that specific 
application to be exposed. Granted this may be a poor example, but it 
does illustrate that layers provide security improvements. Of course 
this kind of setup does provide management and usability challenges but 
that is an area for improvement.

Anyway I hope that my opinion is helpful,

Cliffe.


-- 
Z. Cliffe Schreuders
BSc Comp Sci (Hons) & Int Comp
PhD Candidate, Casual Tutor
School of IT
Murdoch University
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Messages in current thread:
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Cliffe, (Tue Nov 6, 3:26 am)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Nov 6, 11:35 pm)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Wed Nov 7, 12:34 am)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Oct 30, 11:01 am)