(finally starting to make headway through this thread over a month late)

Quoting Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk):
quoted text
> > To reject an LSM for providing "bad" security, IMHO you should have to
> > show how it is possible to subvert the self-stated goals of that LSM.
> > Complaints that the LSM fails to meet some goal outside of its stated
> > purpose is irrelevant. Conjecture that it probably can be violated
> > because of $contrivance is just so much FUD.
> 
> That seems to be an appropriate test.
> 
> > Exception: it is valid to say that the self-stated goal is too narrow to
> > be useful. But IMHO that bar of "too narrow" should be very, very low.
> > Defenses against specific modes of attack would be a fine thing to build
> > up in the library of LSMs, especially if we got a decent stacking module
> > so that they could be composed.
> 
> Once you have stacking then it actually at times will make sense to have
> security modules that do one very precise thing and do it well.

Hey - I thought it was the other way around?  :)

-serge
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