Re: [PATCH] file capabilities: allow sigcont within session (v2)

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To: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@...>
Cc: lkml <linux-kernel@...>, <linux-security-module@...>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...>, Andrew Morgan <morgan@...>, Chris Wright <chrisw@...>, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@...>, Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@...>, Natalie Protasevich <protasnb@...>
Date: Thursday, November 1, 2007 - 8:07 am

On Wed, 2007-10-31 at 18:49 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:

Description doesn't match the code.  And in the non-matching uid case,
check_kill_permission typically returns an error before it reaches
cap_task_kill (modulo the special cases).


I'm confused - if you are allowing all signals within the same uid, then
what was the point of having a cap_task_kill at all?  cap_task_kill was
supposed to prevent a process with lesser capabilities from killing a
process with more capabilities, even if they have the same uid, so that
when you have a program marked with file capabilities instead of a
setuid-0 program, that program can't be sent arbitrary signals by the
caller.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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Messages in current thread:
[PATCH] file capabilities: allow sigcont within session (v2), Serge E. Hallyn, (Wed Oct 31, 7:49 pm)
Re: [PATCH] file capabilities: allow sigcont within session ..., Stephen Smalley, (Thu Nov 1, 8:07 am)