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Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to static interface)

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To: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...>, Peter Dolding <oiaohm@...>
Cc: <linux-kernel@...>, <linux-security-module@...>
Date: Tuesday, October 30, 2007 - 3:14 pm

--- Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de> wrote:


As some of the early Smack discussions brought out, some LSMs
including Smack will be perfectly happy with the traditional
Linux privilege mechanisms (choice of root and/or capablities)
while others including SELinux will go their own ways. So long
as LSMs are self contained and strictly restrictive the
mechanisms they use to modulate their behavior shouldn't be an
issue. If SELinux chooses to turn its MLS controls off between
midnight and 3am I can't see how that would be Smack's business,
even if they were somehow stacked. Multiple LSMs has issues,
like what should security_secid_to_secctx() return to the audit
system, but privilege model shouldn't be one of them.


Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com
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Messages in current thread:
Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion t..., Casey Schaufler, (Tue Oct 30, 3:14 pm)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Nov 6, 11:35 pm)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Wed Nov 7, 12:34 am)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Oct 30, 11:01 am)
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