On 10/25/2007 10:42 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
quoted text
> I agree that security code does need to provide security. What we
> need to get away from is the automatic attacks that are based on 20th
> century computer system assumptions. Things like "name based access
> control is rediculous", and "a module can't be any good if it doesn't
> deal with all objects", or "the granularity isn't fine enough". Look
> at TOMOYO. It's chuck full of good ideas. Why spend so much energy
> badgering them about not dealing with sockets? How about helping the
> AppArmor crew come up with acceptable implementations rather than
> whinging about the evils of hard links? And maybe, just maybe, we can
> get away from the inevitable claim that you could do that with a few
> minutes work in SELinux policy, but only if you're a security
> professional of course.

Casey,

Thank you introducing TOMOYO Linux. I really like your idea of
simplified MAC (and you work so hard!). I also find advantages
of AppArmor for distributing policies with less hustle. Finally
and most importantly, I respect SELinux as the first in-tree,
flexible and reliable security frame work and respect developers
involved.

As a project manager of TOMOYO Linux, I would like to
push it, of course. But I noticed, if each of LSM module
developer begin pushing their own code, that's not for the
sake of Linux and we may end up with chaos.

Instead of pushing TOMOYO Linux, I started developing
comparison chart of security-enhance Linux implementations.
The current version can be found in

http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/wiki-e/?WhatIs#comparison

I would like to receive feedbacks from Stephen, Crispin
(you already have a comparison, though :),
Casey and any people interested in. If possible,
I would like to include opinions from BSD people.

I would like LSM to be the result of common requirements.
"Common" means good in general, but not always for security
perspective. IMHO, I think it is possible for us to get to the
conclusion not to have a framework.

Cheers (and with love to Linux),
Toshiharu Harada

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