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Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion to static interface)

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To: <rmeijer@...>
Cc: <casey@...>, Chris Wright <chrisw@...>, Adrian Bunk <bunk@...>, Simon Arlott <simon@...>, <linux-kernel@...>, <linux-security-module@...>, Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@...>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...>, Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...>, Thomas Fricaccia <thomas_fricacci@...>, Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@...>, James Morris <jmorris@...>, Giacomo Catenazzi <cate@...>, Alan Cox <alan@...>
Date: Monday, October 29, 2007 - 3:41 pm

Rob Meijer wrote:
Ah! So the proposal really is to have an LSM maintainer for each
"family" of models, acting as a resource and arbiter for modules in a class.

I like that idea, and have no objection to it. However, it does have
resource problems, in that the pool of LSM maintainers is not that
large. There is also the likely objection that this degree of scale is
not needed until at least there are multiple families of models in the
upstream kernel, and possibly until there are multiple instances of a
single family in the upstream kernel.

It also begs the question of what constitutes a family.

    * AppArmor, SELinux, and TOMOYO are all ambient capability systems
          o AppArmor and TOMOYO are pathname based
          o SELinux is label based
    * SELinux and SMACK are label-based
          o I don't know if SMACK is an ambient capability system
    * Rob Meijer implicitly advocated for an object capability LSM
          o would it be pathname or label based? You could do either or
            both ...
    * The LSPP work from RH, Tresys, and TCS is MLS based
          o this is a subset of both label-based and ambient capability
            based
    * I have no clue what family to put MultiADM or Dazuko into
    * Getting very formal, I could imagine a Clarke-Wilson module
    * Getting very informal, I could imagine a module that is a
      collection of cute intrusion prevention hacks, such as the Open
      wall Linux symlink and hardlink restrictions, and my own RaceGuard
      work
          o Oh wait, I published
            <http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cowan01raceguard.html>
            RaceGuard. Does that make it formal? :-)

Crispin

-- 
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.               http://crispincowan.com/~crispin
CEO, Mercenary Linux		   http://mercenarylinux.com/
	       Itanium. Vista. GPLv3. Complexity at work

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Messages in current thread:
Re: Linux Security *Module* Framework (Was: LSM conversion t..., Crispin Cowan, (Mon Oct 29, 3:41 pm)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Nov 6, 11:35 pm)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Wed Nov 7, 12:34 am)
Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface, Casey Schaufler, (Tue Oct 30, 11:01 am)
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