-- 
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On Thu, 25 Oct 2007 23:40:24 -0700

jjohansen@suse.de wrote:
before going into the LSM / security side of things, I'd like to get

the VFS guys to look at your VFS interaction code.
In addition, I'd like to ask you to put a file in Documentation/

somewhere that describes what AppArmor is intended security protection

is (it's different from SELinux for sure for example); by having such a

document for each LSM user, end users and distros can make a more

informed decision which module suits their requirements... and it also

makes it possible to look at the implementation to see if it has gaps

to the intent, without getting into a pissing contest about which

security model is better; but unless the security goals are explicitly

described that's a trap that will keep coming back... so please spend

some time on getting a good description going here..
--

If you want to reach me at my work email, use arjan@linux.intel.com

For development, discussion and tips for power savings,

visit http://www.lesswatts.org

-

It's been NACKed a few times, and just reposting it won't help.
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Let me repeat what I have said before in another context. The past discussions

on linux-kernel were useful for a while, and we got constructive feedback

which we could act upon, but then the feedback became very non-constructive

again, and you NACKed patches without giving any good reasons. I have asked

for specific feedback but didn't get any in:
 - Rejecting the vfsmount additions,

   http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118350187712375
 - VFS layering fuck-up accusation,

   http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=118348050804600
So can we pick up things there again, and have a real discussion about the

things you criticize?
Thanks,

Andreas

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Hmm, I agree that it makes sense to give a short overview of each LSM. A

description of the AppArmor model and implementation can be found in the

directory that John referred to actually. I'm unsure how much of that makes

sense under Documentation/ -- what do you think? 
 http://forgeftp.novell.com/apparmor/LKML_Submission-Oct-07/techdoc.pdf
I guess actual end user information doesn't belong in the kernel sources; that

really seems wrong.
Thanks,

Andreas

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On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 22:44:56 +0200
My main concern for now is a description of what it tries to protect

against/in what cases you would expect to use it. THe reason for asking

this explicitly is simple: Until now the LSM discussions always ended

up in a nasty mixed up mess around disagreeing on the theoretical model

of what to protect against and the actual implementation of the threat

protection. THe only way I can think of to get out of this mess is to

have the submitter of the security model give a description of what his

protection model is (and unless it's silly, not argue about that), and

then only focus on how the code manages to achieve this model, to make

sure there's no big gaps in it, within its own goals/reference.
On the first part (discussion of the model) I doubt we can get people

to agree, that's pretty much phylosophical... on the second part (how

well the code/design lives up to its own goals) the analysis can be

objective and technical.
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If you want to reach me at my work email, use arjan@linux.intel.com

For development, discussion and tips for power savings,

visit http://www.lesswatts.org

-

I really, really like this proposal. It is essentially what I have

I will try to do that as soon as possible. While I will strive to be

both clear and precise, achieving both is challenging. So, if someone

discovers a mis-match between the description and the code, would a

patch to the description be an acceptable resolution, if it did not

render the model silly?
Crispin
--

Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.               http://mercenarylinux.com/

	       Itanium. Vista. GPLv3. Complexity at work
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On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 15:16:53 -0700
I think it's entirely reasonable that if it turns out that the code

can't do a certain aspect of the envisioned security (eg not just a

code bug but a design level issue), the answer is to adjust the

vision...
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If you want to reach me at my work email, use arjan@linux.intel.com

For development, discussion and tips for power savings,

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-

Okay, I see what you mean. Thanks.

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yes this is needed and a good idea in general
thanks

john

On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 11:34:48 -0700
would you mind posting your first stab at this to the list shortly,

because without that it's nearly impossible to review your patchkit in

a sensible way...

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On Thu, Oct 25, 2007 at 11:40:24PM -0700, jjohansen@suse.de wrote:

Sorry this got dropped some how.
This submission of the AppArmor security module is based against -mm.
Any comments and feedback to improve implementation are appreciated.
The patch series consists of five areas:
 (1) Pass struct vfsmount through to LSM hooks.
 (2) Fixes and improvements to __d_path():
     (a) make it unambiguous and exclude unreachable paths from

         /proc/mounts,
     (b) make its result consistent in the face of remounts,
     (c) introduce d_namespace_path(), a variant of d_path that goes up

         to the namespace root instead of the chroot.
     (d) the behavior of d_path() and getcwd() remain unchanged, and

     there is no hidding of unreachable paths in /proc/mounts.  The

     patches addressing these have been seperated from the AppArmor

     submission and will be introduced at a later date.

=20

     Part (a) has been in the -mm tree for a while; this series includes

     an updated copy of the -mm patch. Parts (b) and (c) shouldn't be too

     controversial.
 (3) Be able to distinguish file descriptor access from access by name

     in LSM hooks.
     Applications expect different behavior from file descriptor

     accesses and accesses by name in some cases. We need to pass this

     information down the LSM hooks to allow AppArmor to tell which is

     which.
 (4) Convert the selinux sysctl pathname computation code into a standalone

     function.
 (5) The AppArmor LSM itself.
     (See below.)
A tarball of the kernel patches, base user-space utilities, example

profiles, and technical documentation (including a walk-through) are

available at:
  http://forgeftp.novell.com/apparmor/LKML_Submission-Oct-07/
Only the most recent features are covered in brief here for a more

complete explaination please refere to the technical documentation.
Changes since previous submission

- fix wrong error code for failed pathname

- fix change_profile ref...
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