On Wed, 24 Oct 2007 17:41:28 -0700 Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> wrote:I'll be happy to help out; I'd consider my self neutral in this space not having worked with any of the LSM out there. I do think we need to be somewhat critical to what we accept; we should at least be able to filter out "pretend security" somehow. (this is not the same as saying that you're bad if you only provide a limited security, in the contrary, I strongly believe in simple pieces. What I mean is that we should be critical to things that appear/claim to be strong but are not). Secondly, we should make sure that no new holes are added (the original SMACK series suffered from this, Al Viro helped getting that reviewed bigtime). In addition we probably should strive to getting some sort of rough "this is sort of where we draw the line" guideline set up, just to keep things more objective. (Oh and of course, if a security module is deeply involved in another kernel subsystem, say networking or the VFS, very obviously we should consult and listen to the respective maintainers of that subsystem; LSM is not there to be a big hook to bypass the process of well maintained subsystems) -
| Greg KH | [GIT PATCH] driver core patches against 2.6.24 |
| Hiten Pandya | Re: up? (emacs docbook xml ide) |
| Andy Whitcroft | clam |
| Kamalesh Babulal | Re: 2.6.23-rc6-mm1 |
git: | |
| Stephen Hemminger | Re: iptables very slow after commit 784544739a25c30637397ace5489eeb6e15d7d49 |
| David Miller | [GIT]: Networking |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
