--- Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> wrote:I agree that security code does need to provide security. What we need to get away from is the automatic attacks that are based on 20th century computer system assumptions. Things like "name based access control is rediculous", and "a module can't be any good if it doesn't deal with all objects", or "the granularity isn't fine enough". Look at TOMOYO. It's chuck full of good ideas. Why spend so much energy badgering them about not dealing with sockets? How about helping the AppArmor crew come up with acceptable implementations rather than whinging about the evils of hard links? And maybe, just maybe, we can get away from the inevitable claim that you could do that with a few minutes work in SELinux policy, but only if you're a security professional of course. Sure, some LSM proposals will be lousy, and some really will be better done as an SELinux policy module. Some will even have merit but require unreasonable interface changes. As people who care about security (y'all who are only from the LKML are excused) it is our obligation to look beyond the preconceived notions of what is and isn't secure. Security is subjective. It's how you feel about it. Casey Schaufler casey@schaufler-ca.com -
| James Bottomley | [Ksummit-2008-discuss] Fixing the Kernel Janitors project |
| Greg KH | [GIT PATCH] driver core patches against 2.6.24 |
| Tarkan Erimer | Re: Dual-Licensing Linux Kernel with GPL V2 and GPL V3 |
| David Miller | Slow DOWN, please!!! |
git: | |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
| David Miller | [GIT]: Networking |
| Jarek Poplawski | [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| David Miller | Re: iptables very slow after commit 784544739a25c30637397ace5489eeb6e15d7d49 |
