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Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching

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To: Stephen Smalley <sds@...>
Cc: Lars Marowsky-Bree <lmb@...>, James Morris <jmorris@...>, Pavel Machek <pavel@...>, Crispin Cowan <crispin@...>, Greg KH <greg@...>, Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@...>, <jjohansen@...>, <linux-kernel@...>, <linux-security-module@...>, <linux-fsdevel@...>
Date: Friday, June 22, 2007 - 7:34 am

On Friday June 22, sds@tycho.nsa.gov wrote:

Saying "protect data" is nearly meaningless without a threat model.
I bet you don't try to protect data from a direct nuclear hit, or a
court order.


AA has a fairly clear threat model.  It involves a flaw in a
program being used by an external agent to cause it to use
privileges it would not normally exercise to subvert privacy or
integrity.
I think this model matches a lot of real threats that real sysadmins
have real concerns about.  I believe that the design of AA addresses
this model quite well. 

What is your threat model?  Maybe it is just different.

NeilBrown
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Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulat..., Neil Brown, (Fri Jun 22, 7:34 am)
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