James Morris wrote:
quoted text
> On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Chris Mason wrote:  
>>> The incomplete mediation flows from the design, since the pathname-based
>>> mediation doesn't generalize to cover all objects unlike label- or
>>> attribute-based mediation.  And the "use the natural abstraction for
>>> each object type" approach likewise doesn't yield any general model or
>>> anything that you can analyze systematically for data flow.
>>>       
>> This feels quite a lot like a repeat of the discussion at the kernel
>> summit.  There are valid uses for path based security, and if they don't
>> fit your needs, please don't use them.  But, path based semantics alone
>> are not a valid reason to shut out AA.
>>     
> The validity or otherwise of pathname access control is not being 
> discussed here.
>
> The point is that the pathname model does not generalize, and that 
> AppArmor's inability to provide adequate coverage of the system is a 
> design issue arising from this.
>   
The above two paragraphs appear to contradict each other.

quoted text
> Recall that the question asked by Lars was whether there were any 
> outstanding technical issues relating to AppArmor.
>
> AppArmor does not and can not provide the level of confinement claimed by 
> the documentation, and its policy does not reflect its actual confinement 
> properties.  That's kind of a technical issue, right?
>   
So if the document said "confinement with respect to direct file access
and POSIX.1e capabilities" and that list got extended as AA got new
confinement features, would that address your issue?

Crispin

-- 
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.               http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/
Director of Software Engineering   http://novell.com
	AppArmor Chat: irc.oftc.net/#apparmor


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