On Dec 06, 2006  13:50 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
quoted text
> On Thu, Dec 07, 2006 at 07:40:05AM +1100, David Chinner wrote:
> > This is an implementation detail - it is possible that file handle,
> > being opaque, could encode a UID/GID of the user that constructed
> > the handle and then allow any process with the same UID/GID to use
> > open_by_handle() on that handle. (I think hch has already pointed
> > this out.)
> 
> While it could do that, I'd be interested to see how you'd construct
> the handle such that it's immune to a malicious user tampering with it,
> or saving it across a reboot, or constructing one from scratch.

If the server has to have processed a real "open" request, say within
the preceding 30s, then it would have a handle for openfh() to match
against.  If the server reboots, or a client tries to construct a new
handle from scratch, or even tries to use the handle after the file is
closed then the handle would be invalid.

It isn't just an encoding for "open-by-inum", but rather a handle that
references some just-created open file handle on the server.  That the
handle might contain the UID/GID is mostly irrelevant - either the
process + network is trusted to pass the handle around without snooping,
or a malicious client which intercepts the handle can spoof the UID/GID
just as easily.  Make the handle sufficiently large to avoid guessing
and it is "secure enough" until the whole filesystem is using kerberos
to avoid any number of other client/user spoofing attacks.

Considering that filesystems like GFS and OCFS allow clients DIRECT
ACCESS to the block device itself (which no amount of authentication
will fix, unless it is in the disks themselves), the risk of passing a
file handle around is pretty minimal.

Cheers, Andreas
--
Andreas Dilger
Principal Software Engineer
Cluster File Systems, Inc.

-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html