On Wed, Dec 06, 2006 at 01:50:24PM -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
quoted text
> On Thu, Dec 07, 2006 at 07:40:05AM +1100, David Chinner wrote:
> > Permission checks are done on the path_to_handle(), so in reality
> > only root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN users can currently use the
> > open_by_handle interface because of this lack of checking. Given
> > that our current users of this interface need root permissions to do
> > other things (data migration), this has never been an issue.
> > 
> > This is an implementation detail - it is possible that file handle,
> > being opaque, could encode a UID/GID of the user that constructed
> > the handle and then allow any process with the same UID/GID to use
> > open_by_handle() on that handle. (I think hch has already pointed
> > this out.)
> 
> While it could do that, I'd be interested to see how you'd construct
> the handle such that it's immune to a malicious user tampering with it,
> or saving it across a reboot, or constructing one from scratch.
> 
> I suspect any real answer to this would have to involve cryptographical
> techniques (say, creating a secure hash of the information plus a
> boot-time generated nonce).  Now you're starting to use a lot of bits,
> and compute time, and you'll need to be sure to keep the nonce secret.

An auth header and GSS-API integration would probably be the way
to go here if you really care.

Cheers,

Dave.
-- 
Dave Chinner
Principal Engineer
SGI Australian Software Group
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