On Sun, Feb 11, 2007 at 05:03:29PM +0100, Johannes Schindelin wrote:
If all you've enabled is the ability to set the config, I think we're
still safe, since aliases can't override commands.
Still there are enough config options that might be scary, either now
(the http.ssl* options) or in the future (someone might think that it
makes sense to set the post-commit, post-push, et. al hooks in the
config), that I wouldn't be particularly comfortable letting git-shell
have unrestricted access to set the config without having some
restriction about which config parameters were allowed to be set from
the restricted shell. Why did you add that ability, out of curiosity?
- Ted
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe git" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
| Amit K. Arora | [RFC] Heads up on sys_fallocate() |
| H. Peter Anvin | Re: [RFC 00/15] x86_64: Optimize percpu accesses |
| Nicolas Pitre | Re: [RFC patch 08/18] cnt32_to_63 should use smp_rmb() |
| Bart Van Assche | Integration of SCST in the mainstream Linux kernel |
git: | |
| Jarek Poplawski | [PATCH] pkt_sched: Destroy gen estimators under rtnl_lock(). |
| David Miller | [GIT]: Networking |
| Gerrit Renker | [PATCH 27/37] dccp: Integration of dynamic feature activation - part 2 (server side) |
| Natalie Protasevich | [BUG] New Kernel Bugs |
