[PATCH] Make object creation in http fetch a bit safer.

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To: Daniel Barkalow <barkalow@...>
Cc: <git@...>
Date: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 - 5:55 am

Unlike write_sha1_file() that tries to create the object file in a
temporary location and then move it to the final location, fetch_object
could have been interrupted in the middle, leaving a corrupt file.

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>

---

 I think the packfile side is safer -- the index is verified
 with the call to parse_pack_index() which eventually calls
 check_packed_git_idx() to validate it, and the pack file is
 checked when it is first used, just like any pack file we
 originally had.  Ideally, we should validate the pair after
 downloading with git-verify-pack, though.

 http-fetch.c |   29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

09d920831edba17fe983269a9d0d85e592dd4bb3
diff --git a/http-fetch.c b/http-fetch.c
--- a/http-fetch.c
+++ b/http-fetch.c
@@ -350,13 +350,18 @@ int fetch_object(struct alt_base *repo, 
 	char *hex = sha1_to_hex(sha1);
 	char *filename = sha1_file_name(sha1);
 	unsigned char real_sha1[20];
+	char tmpfile[PATH_MAX];
+	int ret;
 	char *url;
 	char *posn;
 
-	local = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0666);
+	snprintf(tmpfile, sizeof(tmpfile), "%s/obj_XXXXXX",
+		 get_object_directory());
 
+	local = mkstemp(tmpfile);
 	if (local < 0)
-		return error("Couldn't open local object %s\n", filename);
+		return error("Couldn't create temporary file %s for %s: %s\n",
+			     tmpfile, filename, strerror(errno));
 
 	memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
 
@@ -386,18 +391,32 @@ int fetch_object(struct alt_base *repo, 
 		return -1;
 	}
 
+	fchmod(local, 0444);
 	close(local);
 	inflateEnd(&stream);
 	SHA1_Final(real_sha1, &c);
 	if (zret != Z_STREAM_END) {
-		unlink(filename);
+		unlink(tmpfile);
 		return error("File %s (%s) corrupt\n", hex, url);
 	}
 	if (memcmp(sha1, real_sha1, 20)) {
-		unlink(filename);
+		unlink(tmpfile);
 		return error("File %s has bad hash\n", hex);
 	}
-	
+	ret = link(tmpfile, filename);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		/* Same Coda hack as in write_sha1_file(sha1_file.c) */
+		ret = errno;
+		if (ret == EXDEV && !rename(tmpfile, filename))
+			goto out;
+	}
+	unlink(tmpfile);
+	if (ret) {
+		if (ret != EEXIST)
+			return error("unable to write sha1 filename %s: %s",
+				     filename, strerror(ret));
+	}
+ out:
 	pull_say("got %s\n", hex);
 	return 0;
 }

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Messages in current thread:
[PATCH] Make object creation in http fetch a bit safer., Junio C Hamano, (Wed Sep 21, 5:55 am)
Re: [PATCH] Make object creation in http fetch a bit safer., Daniel Barkalow, (Wed Sep 21, 11:55 am)